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THE GOLDILOCKS APPROACH: FINANCIAL RISK
AND STAGED REGULATION
Charles K. Whitehead†
Financial firms engage in a wide range of private conduct.  New rules
that address financial risk can regulate elements of that conduct, but not all
conduct or all the factors that affect conduct.  There is, therefore, a real con-
cern that new regulation will have unanticipated consequences, particularly
in a system as complex as the financial markets.  The result may be new risks
or a shift in risk taking away from regulated conduct—responses that regula-
tors can anticipate but may not be able to accurately predict or control.
This Article cautions against the rush to adopt new financial risk regu-
lation without first assessing its broader impact on risk taking.  Attempting
to do so with limited information may be difficult.  For illustration, it touches
on three areas where new regulation may result in new (or greater) risks:
bank capital requirements, a financial transaction tax, and disclosure in the
credit default swap market.
A better approach may be to introduce new regulation in stages—what I
refer to as the “Goldilocks approach.”  Increasingly, regulators should be au-
thorized to phase in or forego new regulation over time as it becomes clear,
through experience, what the likely impact will be.  At its heart, the Goldi-
locks approach relies on real options to develop new rules.  Through staging,
regulators can acquire additional information on the impact of new rules on
conduct and, as necessary, adjust those rules to reflect any unanticipated
consequences—perhaps a more effective approach to implementing regulation
than efforts to finalize new rules from the outset.
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INTRODUCTION
The history of U.S. financial regulation, in many respects, is a
history of unanticipated consequences.1  There are a number of well-
known examples.  Deposit insurance, for example, was introduced in
order to minimize the risk of bank runs.2  Yet, it also encouraged
greater risk taking by bank managers who were no longer subject to
the same scrutiny by now-guaranteed depositors.3  Likewise, bank cap-
ital requirements were intended to raise capital levels against the risk
of bank losses and the possibility of failure.4  Early versions, however,
were structured as simple capital-to-asset ratios that failed to distin-
guish between higher- and lower-credit assets, prompting some bank
managers to make riskier investments.5  Regulators later amended the
capital requirements to reflect the relative riskiness of a bank’s portfo-
lio assets.  Those with greater risk triggered higher capital require-
ments.  Nevertheless, the relative risk-weightings did not always reflect
the actual risks that banks incurred and, in some instances, may have
1 In this Article, a regulation’s “unanticipated consequences” refer to outcomes, un-
related to the regulation’s principal purpose, that result from the influence of the regula-
tion on regulated entities in ways the regulators did not anticipate. See infra notes 33–41 R
and accompanying text.  It may be difficult to predict, with certainty, the results of a partic-
ular set of new rules, partly due to the inability to know how they will affect conduct under
the existing circumstances. See ROBERT K. MERTON, ON SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SCIENCE
175–77 (Piotr Sztompka ed. 1996); see also FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND
PROFIT 201–02 (1921) (noting that people react to what they infer about the future, not
what they perceive about the past).
2 See Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 14–15
(2010); see also infra note 44 and accompanying text. R
3 See ALAN GART, REGULATION, DEREGULATION, REREGULATION: THE FUTURE OF THE
BANKING, INSURANCE, AND SECURITIES INDUSTRIES 18, 168–69 (1994); Stephen A. Buser et
al., Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Policy, and Optimal Bank Capital, 35 J. FIN. 51, 52
(1981) (discussing other mechanisms which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) uses to control risk taking in the absence of pressure from depositors); Gerard
Gennotte & David Pyle, Capital Controls and Bank Risk, 15 J. BANKING & FIN. 805, 806 (1991)
(discussing the distributional effects of FDIC insurance); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Deregula-
tion and Reregulation: Rhetoric and Reality, 6 J.L. & POL. 287, 298–99 (1990) (noting that
financial deregulation exacerbated the moral hazard effects of FDIC insurance).
4 See Whitehead, supra note 2, at 25–26; see also infra notes 51–52 and accompanying R
text (discussing capital requirements and their unintended consequences in more depth).
5 See Malcolm C. Alfriend, International Risk-Based Capital Standard: History and Expla-
nation, FED. RES. BANK RICHMOND ECON. REV., Nov./Dec. 1988, at 28, 30; Gennotte & Pyle,
supra note 3, at 807; Daesik Kim & Anthony M. Santomero, Risk in Banking and Capital R
Regulation, 43 J. FIN. 1219, 1220 (1988); Michael Koehn & Anthony M. Santomero, Regula-
tion of Bank Capital and Portfolio Risk, 35 J. FIN. 1235, 1243–44 (1980); Ronald E. Shrieves &
Drew Dahl, The Relationship Between Risk and Capital in Commercial Banks, 16 J. BANKING &
FIN. 439, 456 (1992); see also infra notes 53–54 and accompanying text (noting that capital R
requirements likely led to greater bank risk taking).
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prompted banks to assume even greater risks.6  In each case, a result
of new regulation designed to reduce risk in one area was the need to
regulate new risk in another.
This Article cautions against the rush to adopt new financial risk
regulation,7 in the wake of the recent financial crisis, without the abil-
ity to first assess its broader impact on risk taking.8  Banks and other
6 See Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial In-
stitutions: Rethinking the Basel Architecture 36–51 (Nov. 13, 2011) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://cms1.runtime.com/null/Romano,+R+-+Fall+11+WS?exclusive=
filemgr.download&file_id=61422&showthumb=0; see also infra note 67 and accompanying R
text.
7 In general, financial risk regulation restricts the amounts and types of risk bearing
that a financial intermediary can assume. See Robert Charles Clark, The Soundness of Finan-
cial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1, 15–18, 23–24 (1976) (discussing reasons for the regulation
of financial intermediaries in particular); Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored
Financial Services Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 352–59 (1999);
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for
Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1155, 1165 (1988).  These regulations may act di-
rectly through requirements that circumscribe the riskiness of the intermediary’s portfolio
assets and its capital structure, as noted earlier.  They may also regulate indirectly through
transaction taxes, disclosure requirements, or rules regarding net worth, capital, or surplus
that effectively cap a firm’s risk-taking activities. See Charles K. Whitehead, What’s Your
Sign?—International Norms, Signals, and Compliance, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 695, 721–25 (2006)
(discussing the Basel Accord).  Together, the rules moderate the amount of risk that an
intermediary can incur, in part, by restricting the asset and liability sides of its balance
sheet. See Clark, supra, at 47.
8 New financial regulation is often reactive—focusing, after the fact, on sealing up
leaks in the financial system exposed by a crisis, a shift in the markets, or other change that
threatens financial market stability. See Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the
Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 418–24 (2006) (describing
the tendency of reactive regulation to follow financial crises); Jerry W. Markham, Banking
Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 221, 221 (2000) (describing bank
regulation as “a set of accumulated responses to a long history of financial crises, scandals,
happenstance, personalities and compromises”); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Regulating
Risk Not Function, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 441, 480–81 (1998) (finding that “our regulatory struc-
ture has generally been reactive to market events, thus focusing on existing products and
activities”).  Overreaction may result in new rules that fail to properly regulate financial
risk taking. See infra notes 212–14 and accompanying text (addressing concerns that new R
rules may overestimate the financial risks they are intended to regulate).  Members of the
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (CCMR), an independent committee of finan-
cial experts, share this view with respect to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered
sections 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 41 of U.S.C. (Supp. IV 2010)). See Letter from CCMR to
Senators Christopher Dodd and Richard Shelby and Representatives Barney Frank and
Spencer Bachus, The Pace of Rulemaking Under the Dodd-Frank Act (Dec. 15, 2010),
available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/2010.12.15_Rulemaking_Timeline_Letter.
pdf (cautioning against a rulemaking process that appears to be more concerned with
speed than quality).  Regulators have also cautioned against hasty regulation. See Klaus C.
Engelen, The Post-Subprime Regulation Scramble: The Regulators and Market Players Pick Up the
Pieces, INT’L ECON., Winter 2008, at 62, 68; see also Luca Enriques, Regulators’ Response to the
Current Crisis and the Upcoming Reregulation of Financial Markets: One Reluctant Regulator’s
View, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1147, 1155 (2009) (noting that “excessive reregulation today is
the best guarantee of effective pressure towards deregulation tomorrow”).  A similar cau-
tion applies to deregulation.  As Susan Rose-Ackerman has observed,
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financial firms engage in a wide range of private conduct that is not
publicly observable.9  New rules can regulate elements of that con-
duct—but not all conduct or all the factors that affect that conduct.10
There is, therefore, a real risk that new rules will have unanticipated
consequences, particularly in a system as complex as today’s financial
markets.11  Depending on how market participants react, the new
rules may be less effective than expected or result in a shift in risk
taking away from the regulated activity—potentially benefiting some
actors at the expense of others.12
Deregulation of one area of the economy may itself produce the need for
more regulation someplace else.  In moving toward a more competitive sit-
uation in one dimension, bottlenecks and market imperfections in other
dimensions may become newly relevant. . . .  In short, deregulation in one
area often requires new regulation and oversight someplace else.
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Defending the State: A Skeptical Look at “Regulatory Reform” in the Eight-
ies, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 517, 520, 522 (1990) (discussing airline deregulation).  Conse-
quently, while this Article’s primary focus is on new financial risk regulation, its proposal
on staging regulation, see infra Part II, may also apply to deregulation.
9 See infra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. R
10 See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory
Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 814 (2003) (“The unintended conse-
quences of a rule thus emerge from the complex interactions between the full set of rules
and the human behaviors they motivate.”); see also infra note 37 and accompanying text. R
11 Interaction between new and existing rules may also have unanticipated conse-
quences.  Federal agencies, as a result, have been directed to assess the cumulative effects
of regulation, including “[c]areful consideration, in the analysis of costs and benefits, of
the relationship between new regulations and regulations that are already in effect.”  Cass
R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Mgmt. and Budget, Memorandum for the Heads of Execu-
tive Departments and Agencies, Cumulative Effects of Regulation 2 (Mar. 20, 2012), availa-
ble at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/cumulative-
effects-guidance.pdf.
12 See infra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.  This Article’s principal focus is on R
the potential unintended consequences of new financial risk regulation and how new rules
can prompt outcomes that regulators do not anticipate.  The concern is also applicable to
new regulation in other areas. See, e.g., Kathleen Q. Abernathy, My View from the Doorstep of
FCC Change, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 199, 204–05 (2002) (describing the decision of FCC Com-
missioner Abernathy to keep federal communications regulations to a minimum); Michael
J. Bean, Overcoming Unintended Consequences of Endangered Species Regulation, 38 IDAHO L.
REV. 409, 415 (2002) (asserting that an unanticipated consequence of the Endangered
Species Act is that landowners seek to preclude such species from using their property);
Steve P. Calandrillo, Responsible Regulation: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk Versus Risk Approach to
Federal Health and Safety Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 957, 964 n.19 (2001) (noting the poten-
tial unintended consequences of drinking-water quality standards); Michael Heise, The Un-
intended Legal and Policy Consequences of the No Child Left Behind Act, 86 NEB. L. REV. 119,
124–32 (2007) (describing unanticipated consequences of the No Child Left Behind Act);
William P. Marshall, The Last Best Chance for Campaign Finance Reform, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 335,
342–46 (2000) (describing the potential consequences of campaign-finance regulation);
William H. Rodgers, Jr., Where Environmental Law and Biology Meet: Of Pandas’ Thumbs, Statu-
tory Sleepers, and Effective Law, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 25, 57–58 (1993) (discussing environ-
mental law’s “sleepers” or “provisions with consequences exceeding the formal legislative
vision”); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1390, 1390–91 (1994) (offering examples of unintended consequences from minimum
wage laws, pollution regulation, government monitoring of the release of information, and
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Consider the example of automobile safety regulation.  The Na-
tional Highway and Traffic Safety Administration sets design standards
for new vehicles sold in the United States.13  The first safety standards
included requirements regarding front-lap seatbelts, energy-absorbing
steering columns, and penetration-resistant windshields.14  In 1975,
Sam Peltzman argued that the new standards had failed to reduce fa-
talities even though occupant deaths had declined.15  The safety bene-
fits, he claimed, were offset by increased risk taking by drivers who
were now more protected, raising the risk of injury to others, espe-
cially pedestrians.  Rather than reducing risk, the new requirements
had simply shifted it from drivers to nonoccupants.16
Peltzman’s study sparked a heated debate.17  One analysis found
different results based on modest changes to Peltzman’s model,18 and
others failed to find compensating behavior when drivers used
seatbelts.19  Still, Peltzman’s conclusions also found substantial sup-
port.  Nondrivers, for example, were found to face an increased risk of
death following the debut of mandatory air bags,20 and seatbelt effec-
campaign finance regulation).  Consequently, this Article’s proposal on staging new regu-
lation, see infra Part II, may have application beyond the financial markets.
13 See National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (NTMVSA), 15 U.S.C. § 1392
(1988 & Supp. V 1993) (repealed 1994) (recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 30111 (2006)) (requir-
ing the Secretary of Transportation to establish automobile safety standards).  The
NTMVSA was created to “reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries resulting from
traffic accidents.”  49 U.S.C. § 30101.  It directed the Secretary of Transportation to issue
motor vehicle safety standards that “shall be practicable, meet the need for motor vehicle
safety, and be stated in objective terms.” Id.  § 30111(a).  The Secretary’s general authority
to issue safety standards under the NTMVSA was, in turn, delegated to the National High-
way and Traffic Safety Administrator. See 49 C.F.R. § 1.50(a) (2011).
14 See Ashley W. Warren, Compliance with Governmental Regulatory Standards: Is It Enough
to Immunize a Defendant from Tort Liability?, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 763, 795 (1997).
15 See Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 677,
677, 681, 717 (1975).
16 See id. at 700.
17 See, e.g., Paul W. MacAvoy, The Regulation of Accidents, in AUTO SAFETY REGULATION:
THE CURE OR THE PROBLEM? 83, 85–87 (Henry G. Manne & Roger LeRoy Miller eds., 1976);
Richard R. Nelson, Comments on Peltzman’s Paper on Automobile Safety Regulation, in AUTO
SAFETY REGULATION: THE CURE OR THE PROBLEM?, supra at 63, 63–67; H.C. Joksch, Critique of
Sam Peltzman’s Study: The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 8 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PRE-
VENTION 129, 129 (1976); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoret-
ical and “Empirical” Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 239–45 (1988);
Leon S. Robertson, A Critical Analysis of Peltzman’s “The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation,”
11 J. ECON. ISSUES 587, 587–88 (1977); Leon S. Robertson, Automobile Safety Regulations and
Death Reductions in the United States, 71 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 818, 818 (1981).
18 See John D. Graham & Steven Garber, Evaluating the Effects of Automobile Safety Regu-
lation, 3 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 206, 207 (1984).
19 See, e.g., Alma Cohen & Liran Einav, The Effects of Mandatory Seat Belt Laws on Driving
Behavior and Traffic Fatalities, 85 REV. ECON. & STAT. 828, 828 (2003) (finding that nonoc-
cupant fatalities did not rise with increased use of seatbelts).
20 See Steven Peterson et al., Are Drivers of Air-Bag-Equipped Cars More Aggressive? A Test
of the Offsetting Behavior Hypothesis, 38 J.L. & ECON. 251, 252 (1995); see also Robert S.
Chirinko & Edward P. Harper, Jr., Buckle Up or Slow Down? New Estimates of Offsetting Behavior
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tiveness was found to be most strongly correlated with benefits to the
driver, with a much weaker relationship to nonoccupant safety.21  In-
stances of aggressive and inattentive driving also rose as safety condi-
tions improved.22  Even studies that found a decline in fatalities
acknowledged the presence of some compensating conduct among
drivers.23
Whether or not one agrees with Peltzman, the premise that
changes in regulation can shift risky conduct in unanticipated ways is
consistent with concerns raised in the financial markets.24  For illustra-
tion, this Article describes the following three areas where new regula-
tion may result in new (or greater) risk taking.
• First, the effect of raising bank capital requirements is
unclear.  Managers who are risk averse may choose to trade
profits for decreased risk so that an increase in capital will
cause a drop in risk taking.  Alternatively, managers may
choose to maximize a bank’s expected profits without regard
to risk.  New capital regulation, in that case, may impose
greater costs on banks and cause managers to shift invest-
ments into higher-yielding, riskier portfolios.25
• Second, proponents argue that a new financial transac-
tion tax (FTT) on securities trading will reduce “noise” trad-
ing and improve the quality of information revealed by
market prices.  The result, they claim, will be a drop in vola-
tility that, in turn, lowers the cost of raising new capital.
Others argue that an FTT will adversely affect market makers
in addition to noise traders and speculators.  As a result, im-
posing a new tax may drive up the cost of market making and
reduce liquidity.  A drop in liquidity can increase price vola-
tility and, in turn, raise the cost of capital.26
and Their Implications for Automobile Safety Regulation, 12 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 270, 291
(1993) (estimating that air bags may reduce occupant fatalities by 19.1% and raise nonoc-
cupant fatalities by 20%).
21 See Glenn Blomquist, A Utility Maximization Model of Driver Traffic Safety Behavior, 18
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 371, 374 (1986).
22 See Thomas L. Traynor, The Peltzman Hypothesis Revisited: An Isolated Evaluation of
Offsetting Driver Behavior, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 237, 238 (1993).
23 See ROBERT W. CRANDALL ET AL., REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE 68–74 (1986); Rob-
ert W. Crandall & John D. Graham, Automobile Safety Regulation and Offsetting Behavior:  Some
New Empirical Estimates, 74 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 328, 330 (1984); see also MARTIN FRIEDLAND
ET AL., REGULATING TRAFFIC SAFETY 122 (1990) (noting that where safety benefits are appar-
ent to drivers, risk compensation behavior seems more plausible); Kelman, supra note 17, R
at 240 (acknowledging that while the magnitude of a behavioral shift would not offset
engineering gains, “one would expect that the direction of the shift in behavior would be as
Peltzman predicts”).
24 See, e.g., TIM HARFORD, ADAPT: WHY SUCCESS ALWAYS STARTS WITH FAILURE 188–90
(2011) (describing the role that credit derivatives played in the 2008 financial crisis).
25 See infra Part I.A.
26 See infra Part I.B.
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• Finally, studies of the credit markets indicate that, in
general, the effect of greater transparency on market liquid-
ity is neutral or positive.  Since investors have more informa-
tion, improved disclosure also results in a greater ability to
negotiate lower trading costs.  The same may not be true for
credit default swaps (CDS).  Dealers argue that requiring
greater disclosure around CDS trading may impede their
ability to hedge CDS risk.  Competitors may trade ahead of
their hedging activity, causing prices to rise and increasing a
dealer’s CDS costs.  Greater costs may then be passed on to
customers—such as banks and other regulated entities—who
will become less able to rely on CDS to help manage credit
risk.27
As these examples illustrate, it can be difficult to prospectively
assess the impact of new regulation on the financial markets.  Private
actors can be expected to minimize regulatory cost, potentially in ways
that are less obvious to detect.  The result may be a rise in new risks or
a shift in risk taking—responses that regulators can anticipate but may
not be able to accurately predict or control.28
This Article argues that a better approach to new financial risk
regulation is to introduce it in stages—what I refer to as the “Goldi-
locks approach.”29  Regulators should be authorized to phase-in or
forego additional regulation over time as it becomes clear, through
experience, what the likely impact will be.
At its heart, the Goldilocks approach relies on real options to in-
troduce new regulation.  The use of real options in the transactional
world is based on the insight that it can be valuable for managers to
adjust their strategies based on new information they acquire over
time rather than commit to a rigid approach initially.30  The choice of
regulation, of course, is not irreversible.  A poor decision, or a new
rule with unanticipated consequences, can be reversed at a later
stage—but, potentially, at significant expense.  By staging implemen-
tation, regulators can develop additional information on the effect of
new rules on market conduct, potentially at lower cost than a subse-
quent change in regulation.  In that respect, a staged approach may
be less costly than efforts to finalize new rules from the outset.31  Stag-
ing, in fact, may permit regulators to implement more effective regu-
lation—choosing new rules that have a greater likelihood of an
optimal outcome, even if they are less likely than others to be
27 See infra Part I.C.
28 See infra notes 34–43 and accompanying text. R
29 See infra note 150 and accompanying text. R
30 See infra notes 150–57 and accompanying text. R
31 See infra notes 158–90 and accompanying text. R
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achieved, so long as regulators can adjust their strategy at low cost
based on the knowledge they acquire during the staging process.32
Part I describes the potential for unanticipated consequences.  It
offers three examples—bank capital regulation, an FTT, and disclo-
sure in the CDS market.  They illustrate the potential for rules in-
tended to limit risky conduct to result instead in a shift in risk or an
increase in risk taking.  The conduct of market participants may
change either directly in response to new regulation or indirectly due
to the effect of new regulation on factors that affect conduct.
Part II describes the Goldilocks approach—implementing new fi-
nancial regulation in stages.  Uncertainty around new rules can draw
their value into question.  The key is whether new rules can be intro-
duced that address the risks they are designed to regulate while mini-
mizing potentially negative side effects.  Attempting to do both in a
vacuum may be difficult in light of the complexity of the financial
system.  For that reason, new risk regulation may benefit from stag-
ing—providing regulators with new information on the effect of regu-
lation on market conduct as it is phased in and, as necessary,
permitting regulators to adjust the rules to reflect any unanticipated
consequences.
I
RISK REGULATION AND UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES
It should be no surprise that, in an increasingly complex financial
system,33 regulating risk can have unanticipated consequences.  Banks
and other financial firm managers engage in a wide range of activities
in order to maximize profits34 and minimize the risk of loss of employ-
ment due to firm failure.35  Regulation addressing those activities is
typically framed in broad terms—for example, “increasing stability” or
“minimizing systemic risk”—but, in substance, it is often embodied in
rules that specify or limit particular conduct.  The new rules set the
32 See infra notes 159–63 and accompanying text. R
33 See HARFORD, supra note 24, at 184–86; Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation and the R
Regulation of Modern Financial Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1916649; Steven L. Schwarcz, Regu-
lating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 213–15 (2009) (describing
some of the causes and effects of financial market complexity).
34 See Whitehead, supra note 2, at 11–12; see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger R
Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 255 (2010) (describing bank execu-
tives’ incentives to engage in excessive risk taking).
35 A bank’s shareholders have an incentive to increase bank risk taking in order to
maximize value.  The incentives of bank managers will depend on the degree to which
their interests align with shareholders.  Managers whose wealth is bank-specific may have
less interest in risk taking.  Those whose interests are more closely aligned with sharehold-
ers—for example, through ownership of stock or stock options—may be more interested
in incurring risk. See Anthony Saunders et al., Ownership Structure, Deregulation, and Bank
Risk Taking, 45 J. FIN. 643, 644–45 (1990).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\97-5\CRN506.txt unknown Seq: 9  5-JUL-12 15:39
2012] THE GOLDILOCKS APPROACH 1275
terms of that conduct, with a view to achieving the broader public
purpose for which the rules were created.36  What they do not do is
regulate all conduct or the web of private arrangements, in and
outside the firm, that influence conduct and may be difficult for out-
siders to observe.37
In the credit card industry, for example, price is comprised of a
number of elements, including the terms on which credit cards and
related products are sold.  Newly introduced limits on credit card pric-
ing in 2010 resulted in bank efforts to adjust fees in order to maximize
profits.  Some banks in response announced new fees on debit cards
in 2011.38  Thus, the result of regulation that lowered consumer
charges (and profitability) in one area was higher charges in another.
The same motivation can cause private actors, armed with superior
knowledge of their own activities, to adjust their conduct in order to
minimize the cost of regulation,39 often in ways that are difficult to
detect.40  The shadow banking system, for example, arose in response
to rules that increased the cost to a bank of maintaining assets on its
36 As Lori Synder Bennear and Cary Coglianese have described, regulation essentially
is comprised of four components: a command, a target, the consequences of compliance
or noncompliance, and the regulator. See Lori Snyder Bennear & Cary Coglianese, Flexible
Environmental Regulation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 3
(Sheldon Kamieniecki & Michael E. Kraft, eds.) (forthcoming 2012) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1998849. Using that taxonomy, regulation’s
broad framing is its “target,” and the specification or limitation on conduct is its
“command.”
37 See MERTON, supra note 1, at 177; Awrey, supra note 33, at 50–51. R
38 See Tara Siegel Bernard & Ben Protess, Banks to Make Customers Pay Debit Card Fee,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2011, at A1; see also Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit
Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 47–48 (2008) (discussing the use of new penalty fees for late
payments).  The banks later dropped their plans to increase debit card fees in the face of
significant public outcry. See Dan Fitzpatrick & Robin Sidel, BofA Retreats on Debit Fee, Citing
Uproar, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702045
28204577011813902843218.html.
39 See Michael S. Knoll, The Ancient Roots of Modern Financial Innovation: The Early His-
tory of Regulatory Arbitrage, 87 OR. L. REV. 93, 96 (2008) (describing the very early use of put-
call parity to avoid usury laws); Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory
Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (1997).
40 See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Con-
straint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1068 (1962); Awrey, supra note 33, at 53–55. R
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balance sheet.41  In that case, regulation became less effective as a re-
sult of the shift in risky conduct to outside the regulated entity.42
To illustrate the potential of new rules to increase or shift risk, set
forth below are three examples of risk regulation and their potential
consequences.  The first relates to bank capital requirements.  Higher
capital requirements are designed to improve an individual bank’s sta-
bility, but they may also cause an increase in risk taking.  Regulation,
in that case, may directly induce a shift in conduct.
The second example arises from proposals for a new FTT.  A hike
in stock market trading costs can lower “noise” trading and minimize
volatility, but it can also lower market liquidity, magnifying the impact
on share price of trading by the remaining investors (and, in turn,
increasing volatility).  The effect on risk, in that case, may be indi-
rect—an overall increase in volatility that increases the risk borne by
all market participants.
The final example arises from new disclosure requirements for
CDS trading.  Enhanced transparency in the CDS market may have
direct and indirect consequences.  Greater transparency can directly
lower trading costs as well as the level of risky transactions.  It may,
41 See Whitehead, supra note 2, at 25–28.  As former Citigroup Chairman and CEO R
Charles Prince told Representative Barney Frank, off-balance-sheet financing was necessary
because on-balance-sheet financing “would have put Citigroup at a disadvantage with Wall
Street investment banks that were more loosely regulated and were allowed to take far
greater risks.” See Nelson D. Schwartz & Julie Creswell, What Created This Monster?: Yes, the
Markets Can Bite Back, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008 (Sunday Business), at 1.  By 2007, the
shadow banking system had total assets of roughly $6.5 trillion—compared to $4 trillion
for the then five major securities firms and $6 trillion for the top five U.S. bank holding
companies. See Timothy F. Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer, Fed. Reserve
Bank of N.Y., Reducing Systemic Risk in a Dynamic Financial System, Remarks at the Eco-
nomic Club of New York (June 9, 2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/news
events/speeches/2008/tfg080609.html; see also Gary Gorton, Slapped in the Face by the
Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic of 2007 25–29 (May 9, 2009) (Yale Univ. & Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1401882 (computing the ratios of off-balance-sheet activity to on-balance-sheet activity
at these top firms and describing the ratios’ likely impact).
42 Factors beyond (but potentially related to) shareholder and manager interests in
profitability may also affect outcomes.  Thus, for example, the effects of similar banking
rule changes across countries may have significantly different outcomes based, in part, on
differences in the competitive and legal environments in which the banks operate.  In-
creases in deposit insurance are associated with higher risk taking by banks that operate in
market-based, common-law countries, but are associated with lower risk taking among
banks that operate in bank-based civil law countries. See Kathryn L. Dewenter et al., Do
Banking Regulations Have Uniform Effects? Evidence from Changes in Deposit Insurance
27–28 (Dec. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1969701.  Likewise, the effect of capital regulation on a bank’s risk
taking may depend on franchise values and market concentration in the country where it is
operating. See Patrick Behr et al., Market Structure, Capital Regulation and Bank Risk Taking,
37 J. FIN. SERVICES RESEARCH 131, 154–55 (2010); see also infra notes 49–50 and accompany- R
ing text (describing the potential impact of the decline in bank charter values on manage-
ment risk taking).
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however, also cause CDS dealers to adjust how they manage risk, po-
tentially increasing the cost of CDS trades.  At higher cost, customers
may become less able to rely on CDS to manage risk.  New or greater
risks, therefore, may indirectly result from greater disclosure in the
CDS market.
In each case, the effect of new regulation depends on how market
participants respond, which turns, in part, on private conduct that
may not be apparent to regulators.43  The result can be an unantici-
pated increase in risk or shift in risk taking to other parts of the finan-
cial markets.  That outcome can be costly, arguing for the
introduction of a new rulemaking process that permits regulators to
reflect more complete information on market response as new rules
are implemented.
A. Risk-Based Capital
Government-directed insurance helps assure customers of the
safekeeping of their cash and assets held in custody by financial in-
termediaries.  Insurance guarantees that customers will be made
whole, irrespective of the intermediary’s financial health or the reason
for a default, up to specified levels.  For banks, for example, the FDIC
protects general depositors against losses up to $250,000.44  Insurance,
however, creates a risk of moral hazard because banks have an interest
in assuming more risk if insurance or other protection minimizes any
resulting losses.45  With the FDIC bearing a portion of the risk, share-
holder value can improve to the extent that greater leverage (lower
capital) boosts the probability of higher returns.46  Balanced against
risk taking are the risk-reducing incentives of bank managers who ex-
43 See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT
AND REGULATION 1–3 (1993).
44 See Your Insured Deposits, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/insured/
basics.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).  Banks can also access Federal Reserve funds to tem-
porarily cover shortfalls in liquidity in the event of substantial withdrawals. See Mark E. Van
Der Weide & Satish M. Kini, Subordinated Debt: A Capital Markets Approach to Bank Regulation,
41 B.C. L. REV. 195, 204–05 (2000).
45 See Patricia A. McCoy, The Moral Hazard Implications of Deposit Insurance: Theory and
Evidence, in 5 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW 417, 423–25
(2008); Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquid-
ity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 417 (1983); Richard S. Grossman, Deposit Insurance, Regulation, and
Moral Hazard in the Thrift Industry: Evidence from the 1930’s, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 800, 802–03
(1992); Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Capital Adequacy Regulation: In Search of a Rationale
4–6 (Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working Paper No. 03–07, 2002), available at http://
fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/03/0307.pdf.
46 See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Banking Theory, Deposit Insurance, and
Banking Regulation, 59 J. BUS. 55, 59 (1986); Shrieves & Dahl, supra note 5, at 441.  Banks R
are required to pay the FDIC an insurance premium. See Alan J. Marcus & Israel Shaked,
The Valuation of FDIC Deposit Insurance Using Option-Pricing Estimates, 16 J. MONEY CREDIT &
BANKING 446, 447–48 (1984).
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pect to minimize their nondiversifiable employment risk.47  Histori-
cally, shareholders have also been interested in protecting against the
loss of a bank’s charter—its ability, with limited competition, to take
deposits and extend loans48—although charter values have eroded in
light of recent changes in the financial markets.49  Neither incentive
47 See Saunders et al., supra note 35, at 644; see also Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk R
Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 605, 615 (1981)
(discussing competing incentives for bank managers in the merger context).
48 See Michael C. Keeley, Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking, 80 AM.
ECON. REV. 1183, 1184–86 (1990); Alan J. Marcus, Deregulation and Bank Financial Policy, 8 J.
BANKING & FIN. 557, 557–58 (1984); see also Robert A. Bennett, A Banking Puzzle: Mixing
Freedom and Protection, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1984, at F1 (describing the likely effect of the
easing of restrictions on bank charters).
49 See Whitehead, supra note 2, at 16–20.  For example, money market funds (MMFs) R
provide the functional equivalent of deposit taking by banks. See Jonathan R. Macey, Reduc-
ing Systemic Risk: The Role of Money Market Mutual Funds as Substitutes for Federally Insured Bank
Deposits 6, 8 (Yale Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ., & Pub. Policy,
Research Paper No. 422, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1735008 (noting that the needs and expectations of MMF investors and com-
mercial depositors are roughly the same and tracking the functional similarity between the
two); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry,
1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 239–42
(2002) (describing the structure and evolution of MMFs, their comparative advantages
over traditional bank deposits, and congressional attempts to put banks on an equal foot-
ing with MMFs).  Finance companies lend to business and retail borrowers, relying on
MMFs for funding by selling them short-term commercial paper. See JANE W. D’ARISTA &
TOM SCHLESINGER, THE PARALLEL BANKING SYSTEM, BRIEFING PAPER #37, at 7–14 (1993)
(noting that the commercial paper market is the essential link between the borrower and
depositor aspects of MMF activity).  MMFs, in turn, offer investors the convenience of a
bank account with nominally higher returns than bank deposits. See FRANKLIN R. EDWARDS,
THE NEW FINANCE: REGULATION & FINANCIAL STABILITY 73–74 (1996); see also Tamar Fran-
kel, The Scope and Jurisprudence of the Investment Management Regulation, 83 WASH. U. L.Q.
939, 943 (2005) (noting that MMFs, which were not subject to the interest rate caps placed
on banks, were able to offer their customers higher interest rates and traditional banking
services).  Unlike bank deposits, MMF accounts are normally not protected by federal gov-
ernment insurance (although the Treasury Department created a temporary program to
guarantee MMF account balances following the run on MMFs in the fall of 2008). See Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Announces Temporary Guarantee Program for
Money Market Funds (Sept. 29, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/
press-releases/Pages/hp1161.aspx; Insured or Not Insured?, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/con
sumers/consumer/information/fdiciorn.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).  Instead, inves-
tors historically relied on regulations that limited portfolio assets to short-term, highly liq-
uid, and relatively low-risk debt instruments. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(3) to (4) (2011)
(outlining criteria relating to portfolio quality and diversification that MMFs must satisfy);
see also INV. CO. INST., REPORT OF THE MONEY MARKET WORKING GROUP 31–39 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_09_mmwg.pdf (describing the regulation of MMFs).
Investors also relied on the implicit assurance that an MMF’s managers would prevent the
fund’s assets from falling below par, $1 per share. See Leslie Wayne, Investors Lose Money In
‘Safe’ Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1994, at D1 (listing fifteen MMFs whose advisors covered
shortfalls rather than allow fund share prices to fall below $1).  Together, MMFs and fi-
nance companies began to mirror the traditional balance that banks strike, resulting in a
substantial shift in liquid household assets from the banking sector to the capital markets
and a decline in bank charter value. See EDWARDS, supra, at 73–74; D’ARISTA & SCHLES-
INGER, supra, at 3–4, 7–14.  Notwithstanding that decline, greater capital requirements may
themselves limit the ability of newcomers to enter the market and, thereby, increase the
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assures that banks will not incur significant risk, and the decline in
charter value may further reduce a bank manager’s interest in acting
prudently.50  Capital requirements, therefore, assist regulators by set-
ting a minimum capital cushion that banks must maintain relative to
the risky assets in which they can invest.  A bank must raise an amount
of equity capital (or its equivalent) based on the value of its risky as-
sets, thereby limiting its leverage and the size of its balance sheet.51  In
that respect, capital requirements and other portfolio limitations are
similar to bond covenants that restrict managers from incurring risks
that may benefit a bank’s shareholders at its creditors’ expense.52
value of an existing bank’s charter. See Luigi Zingales, The Costs and Benefits of Financial
Market Regulation 24 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Law, Working Paper No. 21/2004, April
2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=536682.
50 See Francisco Gonza´lez, Bank Regulation and Risk-Taking Incentives: An International
Comparison of Bank Risk, 29 J. BANKING & FIN. 1153, 1181–82 (2005); Keeley, supra note 48, R
at 1185–86; Marcus, supra note 48, at 565; Shrieves & Dahl, supra note 5, at 443–44. R
51 See Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capi-
tal Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive 12–13 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance,
Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 86, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1669704.  A description of the original risk-based capital require-
ments appears in GART, supra note 3, at 120–30.  In addition to enhancing bank stability, R
capital requirements protect against the impact of a bank failure on depositors, the possi-
bility of a bank run and, in light of the systemic importance of banks, the resulting harm to
the real economy. See THE JOINT FORUM, RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND REGULATORY
CAPITAL: CROSS-SECTORAL COMPARISON 10–11, 31, 34–38 (2001), available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/joint04.pdf (describing the Basel Accord standards for supervising
banks); Whitehead, supra note 2, at 25, 39–40; Franklin Allen & Richard Herring, Banking R
Regulation Versus Securities Market Regulation 4–7 (Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working Paper
No. 01-29, 2001), available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/ papers/1174.pdf;
Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, Financial Regulation in a System Context 2 (Brookings
Papers on Econ. Activity, Working Paper, 2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/
economics/bpea/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2008_fall_bpea_papers/2008_fall_
bpea_morris_shin.pdf; Anil K. Kashyap et al., Rethinking Capital Regulation 12, 16–18
(Sept. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/
sympos/2008/KashyapRajanStein.09.15.08.pdf.  One unanticipated side product of capital
regulation has been an increase in the procyclicality of the credit markets. See CONG. OVER-
SIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., SPECIAL REP. ON REGULATORY REFORM 26–27 (2009), available at
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-012909-report-regulatory-reform.pdf.  When the
economy is strong, a borrower’s default risk is likely to be remote, minimizing the amount
of capital each bank must raise against prospective loss.  When it sours, however, risk-based
requirements can put pressure on each bank to strengthen its capital cushion at the same
time, thereby reducing its incentive to lend and, in the aggregate, increasing economic
instability. See MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL
REGULATION 13–15 (2009); George G. Pennacchi, Risk-Based Capital Standards, Deposit Insur-
ance, and Procyclicality, 14 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 432, 433 (2005); Rafael Repullo & Javier
Suarez, The Procyclical Effects of Bank Capital Regulation 2 (Working Paper, 2009), available at
http://www.cemfi.es/~suarez/repullo-suarez09.pdf.  Proposals have been made to create
countercyclical capital regulation—raising capital levels when the economy is strong and
lowering them during a downturn to soften the impact of a decline in lending when the
markets weaken.  See, e.g., BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra, at 31–35.
52 See Michael C. Keeley & Frederick T. Furlong, A Reexamination of Mean-Variance
Analysis of Bank Capital Regulation, 14 J. BANKING & FIN. 69, 70 (1990); see also Dan Galai &
Ronald W. Masulis, The Option Pricing Model and the Risk Factor of Stock, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 53, 54
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During the 1970s, bank capital declined precipitously, prompting
U.S. regulators to require banks and bank holding companies to sat-
isfy explicit minimum capital standards.53  Banks were required to
maintain capital in amounts equal to or greater than a fixed percent-
age of assets.  Bank capital ratios rose as a result, but so did bank fail-
ures, partly because the requirements failed to take account of the
assets’ riskiness in a bank’s portfolio.54
Raising a bank’s capital requirements can increase the cost of ex-
tending loans and reduce a bank’s profitability.55  Thus, permitting
banks to compete without restriction risked depressing capital levels
further—potentially resulting in an increase in financial system risk.
Regulators, in response, needed to level the playing field.  Global stan-
dards were developed partly so that banks in one country would not
be disadvantaged relative to banks in another.  The Basel Capital Ac-
cord (Accord), first adopted in 1988,56 called for regulators to impose
a minimum capital level on internationally active banks pegged at
eight percent of risk-weighted assets.57  The Accord fostered coopera-
tion among competing players—principally U.S., U.K., and Japanese
regulators and banks—by committing them to a global standard.58  In
(1976) (using the capital-asset pricing model to describe the relationship between return
to shareholders and debtholders).
53 See GART, supra note 3, at 118–20; SECRETARIAT OF THE BASEL COMM. ON BANKING R
SUPERVISION, THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD: AN EXPLANATORY NOTE 11 (2001), available
at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca01.pdf.
54 The history of U.S. bank capital regulation leading up to the Basel Capital Accord
in 1988 is summarized in GART, supra note 3, at 118–20, and Alfriend, supra note 5, at R
28–30; see also supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. R
55 See Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of Competition in International Financial Regulation, 49
HARV. INT’L L.J. 447, 500–01 (2008).
56 See id. at 503.  The Accord’s evolving approach to managing bank risk is summa-
rized in James Fanto, Anticipating the Unthinkable: The Adequacy of Risk Management in Finance
and Environmental Studies, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 731, 736–37 (2009).  Subsequent ac-
cords—the Basel II and Basel III accords—are described in Hal S. Scott, Reducing Systemic
Risk through the Reform of Capital Regulation, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 763, 765–73 (2010), and
WALTER W. EUBANKS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41467, THE STATUS OF THE BASEL III CAPITAL
ADEQUACY ACCORD 1–13 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41467.pdf.
57 See Patricia A. McCoy, Musings on the Seeming Inevitability of Global Convergence in
Banking Law, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 433, 439 (2001).  The Accord was adopted by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision.  The Basel Committee is comprised of regulators
from the world’s principal financial markets.  Its purpose is to foster international coopera-
tion on supervisory standards, practices, and guidelines for banks.  Committee decisions
are made by consensus, and the Committee’s pronouncements are nonbinding on mem-
bers.  Nevertheless, the Basel Committee has strongly influenced the gradual convergence
in global banking regulation and supervision.  Chief among its successes has been the crea-
tion of uniform bank capital requirements, embodied (as amended from time to time) by
the Accord. See Whitehead, supra note 7, at 720–25. R
58 See Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of International
Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 925, 935–44
(1996); Gadinis, supra note 55, at 502–03.  The conflict that existed among national regula- R
tors and between regulators and banks is summarized in ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN, GOVERNING
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:  INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND THE STATE 113–28 (1994).
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addition, the Accord’s risk-based requirements attempted to sensitize
a bank’s capital levels to the riskiness of its investment portfolio.59  Na-
tional banks, for example, are subject to risk-based standards that vary
the amount of capital a bank must maintain relative to the risk it
bears—in effect, requiring banks with riskier portfolios to raise larger
capital cushions.60
In light of widespread adoption of risk-based capital require-
ments and recent increases under the Accord,61 one would expect
substantial agreement on their benefits as a regulatory tool.  There is,
in fact, a significant division over the effect of capital requirements on
bank conduct and, in particular, over whether they are likely to de-
crease or increase a bank’s risk taking.  This difference reflects,
among other things, competing views of the goals and incentives of
bank managers.62
Under one view, managers who are risk averse may choose to
trade off profits for decreased risk.63  In that case, an increase in capi-
tal requirements may be consistent with reduced risk taking.64  Small
bank managers may be inclined to reduce risk when faced with strictly
59 See Colombatto & Macey, supra note 58, at 938–39. R
60 See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, apps. A(1)(a), B(1)(a) (2011); see also 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, app.
A(I) (2011) (explaining that these requirements are applicable to bank holding compa-
nies as well).
61 Basel III contains several important changes for banks’ capital structures.  Among
them, the minimum amount of common equity, as a percentage of risk-weighted assets,
will increase from 2% to 3.5% by January 1, 2013, eventually rising to 4.5% on January 1,
2015. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAME-
WORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 12–17, 27–28 (2011) [hereinafter
BASEL COMM., GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs189.pdf.  Total Tier 1 capital, which consists primarily of common equity and retained
earnings, will rise from 4% to 6% during the same period. See id. at 12–17, 28.  Basel III
also contains an additional 2.5% “buffer” that banks must maintain for use during times of
financial stress to be phased in between January 1, 2016, and January 1, 2019, bringing the
total equity requirement to 7%. See id. at 54–57.  In addition, Basel III aims to improve the
quality of the banks’ capital base as well as strengthen capital requirements in relation to
various risks to which banks are exposed. See id. at 2–4.
62 See Isabel Argimon & Jenifer Ruiz-Valenzuela, The Effects of Regulatory Stringency and
Risk Sensitivity on Banks, 12 J. BANKING REG. 144, 146–47 (2011).
63 See Joseph P. Hughes et al., Are Scale Economies in Banking Elusive or Illusive?: Evidence
Obtained by Incorporating Capital Structure and Risk-Taking into Models of Bank Production, 25 J.
BANKING & FIN. 2169, 2188 (2001); Kim & Santomero, supra note 5, at 1220–21 (assuming R
risk aversion in developing a model and describing its effects); Koehn & Santomero, supra
note 5, at 1236 (making a similar assumption in developing a separate model and noting R
that the assumption is justified in academic literature); Tom Theobald, For Better Banks,
Risk Management’s Money, WALL ST. J., July 7, 1992, at A14 (discussing the effects of manage-
ment’s equity stake in the bank in determining risk aversion).
64 See Frederick T. Furlong & Michael C. Keeley, Bank Capital Regulation and Asset Risk,
FED. RES. BANK S.F. ECON. REV., Spring 1987, at 20, 30–31.  This assumes that the weights
used to measure risk are an accurate gauge of portfolio riskiness. See Jean-Charles Rochet,
Capital Requirements and the Behaviour of Commercial Banks, 36 EUR. ECON. REV. 1137, 1161
(1992) (comparing credit- and market-based risk weighting).
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enforced regulatory capital standards.65  Likewise, managers at well-
capitalized banks—who may prefer lower levels of risk taking—may
also choose to reduce portfolio risk, or increase capital, after new risk-
based capital regulation is introduced.66
Alternatively, a bank’s managers may choose to maximize the
bank’s expected profits without regard to risk.  Capital regulation, in
that case, may impose greater costs on banks and, in turn, cause bank
managers to shift investments into higher-yielding, riskier portfolios.67
In addition, banks with higher capital levels are less likely to be pres-
sured on which assets they select.68  Managers, in that case, may have
greater discretion in making risky investments as one means to miti-
gate the greater costs of higher capital levels.69  Increased risk taking,
however, is not inevitable.  Even for value-maximizing banks, a higher
capital requirement may reduce risk taking when failure to do so
would force a drop in leverage (increase in capital) or contraction of a
profitable portfolio.70
In fact, both outcomes—risk reduction and risk increase—are
consistent with a 1998 study by Paul Calem and Rafael Rob, which
found that banks react differently to capital regulation depending on
their capital positions and the particular regulatory requirements.71
Specifically, using a cross section of bank data from 1984 to 1993,
Calem and Rob found a U-shaped relationship tied to changes in capi-
tal position and risk taking.72  Severely undercapitalized banks were
likely to take on significant risk—a moral hazard problem—whose
cost was largely borne by the FDIC, as deposit insurer.73  Risk-taking
65 See Joseph P. Hughes & Loretta J. Mester, Evidence on the Objectives of Bank Managers
24 (Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working Paper, No. 94–15, 1994), available at http://
fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/94/9415.pdf.
66 See Kevin Jacques & Peter Nigro, Risk-Based Capital, Portfolio Risk, and Bank Capital: A
Simultaneous Equations Approach, 49 J. ECON. & BUS. 533, 542–43 (1997).
67 See Ju¨rg Blum, Do Capital Adequacy Requirements Reduce Risks in Banking?, 23 J. BANK-
ING & FIN. 755, 756–57 (1999); Gennotte & Pyle, supra note 3, at 820; Saunders et al., supra R
note 35, at 653; see also supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. R
68 See Thomas D. Jeitschko & Shin Dong Jeung, Do Well-Capitalised Banks Take More
Risk? Evidence from the Korean Banking System, 8 J. BANKING REG. 291, 293 (2007).
69 See id.; Shrieves & Dahl, supra note 5, at 455; see also Hughes & Mester, supra note 65 R
(providing empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis).
70 See Furlong & Keeley, supra note 64, at 27–28; Frederick T. Furlong & Michael C. R
Keeley, Capital Regulation and Bank Risk-Taking: A Note, 13 J. BANKING & FIN. 883, 887–89,
891 (1989); see also Raj Aggarwal & Kevin T. Jacques, The Impact of FDICIA and Prompt Correc-
tive Action on Bank Capital and Risk: Estimates Using a Simultaneous Equations Model, 25 J.
BANKING & FIN. 1139, 1156 (2001) (noting that regulatory pressure brought about through
enforcement of prompt corrective-action standards helped reduce portfolio risk levels);
Gennotte & Pyle, supra note 3, at 820 (advocating greater regulatory scrutiny following an R
increase in bank capital requirements in light of the incentives to increase risk).
71 See Paul Calem & Rafael Rob, The Impact of Capital-Based Regulation on Bank Risk-
Taking, 8 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 317, 318–20 (1999).
72 See id. at 319, 329–30.
73 See id. at 320; see also supra notes 46, 67 and accompanying text. R
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incentives, however, declined as capital increased, partly because
banks bore the full cost of a loss of capital if FDIC insurance was not
triggered.74  Risk taking increased again at higher capital levels as
bank managers, whose banks were now sufficiently protected against
insolvency, chose to invest in riskier assets in order to offset higher
costs.75  Consequently, for capital regulation to be effective, Calem
and Rob argued that banks should simply be required to hold enough
capital to minimize the risk of moral hazard (the bottom of the “U”),
as too little or too much capital increased incentives to incur risk, al-
beit for different reasons.76
Thus, even though capital standards have been fine-tuned, they
continue to have unanticipated consequences.  That is, in part, be-
cause the effect of capital requirements on risk taking depends on
how bank managers respond, and regulators have not been able to
fully assess the impact of regulation on how banks allocate capital in-
ternally.77  New rules may not fully reflect the private arrangements
that affect managers, suggesting the need to better calibrate those
rules to management conduct.
B. Trading Costs
A financial transaction tax, or FTT, imposes a tax on transactions
in financial instruments, including the transfer of securities through
stock exchanges, the over-the-counter markets, or otherwise.78  The
European Commission has issued a draft directive that would institute
a common FTT as a means to discourage risky trading activities,79 and
74 See Calem & Rob, supra note 71, at 320, 330; see also supra notes 63–66, 70 and R
accompanying text.
75 See Calem & Rob, supra note 71, at 320, 330–31; see also supra notes 67–69 and R
accompanying text.
76 See Calem & Rob, supra note 71, at 346–47, 349–50. R
77 See Kevin T. Jacques & Lakshmi Balasubramanyan, Risk Weights in Regulatory Capital
Standards: Is It Necessary to “Get It Right”? 29–31 (Ind. State Univ. Networks Fin. Inst., Work-
ing Paper, No. 2011-WP-23, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1940038.
78 See EUR. COMM’N, PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL DIRECTIVE ON A COMMON SYSTEM OF
FINANCIAL TRANSACTION TAX AND AMENDING DIRECTIVE 2008/7/EC 6–8 (2011), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/other_taxes/fi-
nancial_sector/com(2011)594_en.pdf [hereinafter EC PROPOSAL] (describing various pos-
sible structures which an FTT might take in the European Union).  The FTT has its roots
in a transaction tax proposed by John Maynard Keynes as a means to combat short-term
speculation. See infra note 96.  A similar tax was proposed by James Tobin in order to curb R
speculation in the currency markets by “throw[ing] some sand in the wheels”—the so-
called Tobin Tax. See James Tobin, Professor, Yale Univ., A Proposal for International
Monetary Reform, Presidential Address at the 1978 Conference of the Eastern Economic
Association (1978), in 4 E. ECON. J. 153, 154–55 (1978).
79 See EC PROPOSAL, supra note 78, at 2–3.  With the exception of the United States, R
most of the world’s major financial markets at one time have had a significant securities
transaction tax. See Robert Pollin et al., Securities Transaction Taxes for U.S. Financial Markets,
29 E. ECON. J. 527, 534–36 (2003).  An FTT was proposed, but not adopted, in the United
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\97-5\CRN506.txt unknown Seq: 18  5-JUL-12 15:39
1284 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1267
France has already increased its FTT on most stock transfers.80  By
contrast, the International Monetary Fund staff rejected an FTT pro-
posal in 2010 over concern, among other things, that it would dimin-
ish valuable trading without dampening the market volatility often
associated with risky transactions.  The result, they feared, could be an
increase in market risk.81
Key to assessing an FTT’s value is its effect on market conduct.
Like bank risk capital, there is significant division over the likely out-
come.82  On the one hand, by increasing cost, an FTT could discour-
age short-term traders from engaging in high-volume, speculative
transactions.83  On the other hand, an FTT could increase the cost
(and lower the amount) of beneficial activities—such as market mak-
States in 2009. See Let Wall Street Pay for the Restoration of Main Street Act of 2009, H.R.
4191, 111th Cong. (2009); Burton G. Malkiel & George U. Sauter, A Transaction Tax Would
Hurt All Investors, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405
2748703558004574579903734883292.html.
80 See Memorandum from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, French Transfer Tax Re-
form Immediately Applicable to Transfer of Shares of Listed and Non-Listed Companies 1
(Jan. 20, 2012), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/
FrenchTransferTaxReformApplicable-TransferofShares-Listed-NonListedCompanies.pdf.
81 See INT’L MONETARY FUND, A FAIR AND SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION BY THE FINANCIAL
SECTOR: FINAL REPORT FOR THE G-20 19–21 (2010), available at http://www.imf.org/exter
nal/np/g20/pdf/062710b.pdf.  For a definition of volatility, see infra note 91. R
82 See Paul G. Mahoney, Is There a Cure for “Excessive” Trading?, 81 VA. L. REV. 713, 729,
732–36 (1995).
83 See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. R
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ing84—causing a drop in liquidity85 and, potentially, an increase in
the cost of capital-raising.86
Favoring an FTT is its potential to reduce “noise” in the market-
place.  Proponents argue that a subset of investors trades on “noise”—
meaning they lack the fundamental information on which to make an
informed assessment of expected returns but choose to trade any-
way.87  By contrast, informed traders hold rational expectations about
future share prices and, although they may sometimes err, those
lapses should be random and, over time, the traders should learn
from their mistakes.88  Under those circumstances, according to one
account, rational traders should sell shares to (buy shares from) noise
traders, who consistently overestimate (underestimate) share values—
84 See infra note 171 and accompanying text.  A market maker is prepared to trade R
securities for its own account on either side of the market—in other words, it is willing to
be both a buyer and seller of the securities.  A customer can sell securities to the market
maker at its bid price and purchase securities at its ask price.  If there are more buyers than
sellers, or vice versa, the market maker must adjust its inventory to accommodate customer
demand, as well as change the prices at which it is willing to buy and sell securities in order
to rebalance order flow. See Sanford J. Grossman & Merton H. Miller, Liquidity and Market
Structure, 43 J. FIN. 617, 617–18 (1988); Maureen O’Hara & George S. Oldfield, The
Microeconomics of Market Making, 21 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 361, 361 (1986).  Mar-
ket making facilitates capital-raising by providing investors with liquidity, which is done by
ensuring there is always a market for the securities. See Hans R. Stoll, Alternative Views of
Market Making, in MARKET MAKING AND THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES INDUS-
TRY 67, 81–82 (Yakov Amihud et al. eds., 1985); Thomas S.Y. Ho & Anthony Saunders, The
Determinants of Bank Interest Margins: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 16 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 581, 582–83 (1981) (using the similarities between market makers and other fi-
nancial intermediaries to develop a model of bank margins); see also Darrel Duffie, The
Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks 2–4 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 301,
2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work301.pdf (discussing the problems that
plague large dealer banks, especially in their role as intermediaries).
85 Liquidity, in the capital markets, generally refers to the ability to convert an asset
into cash without a significant change in price.  A short-term fixed-income instrument may
be liquid because it will convert to cash (mature) in the near future.  Likewise, an asset’s
liquidity can be determined by how easily it can be sold in the market.  For example, if
Alpha Corp. has only two million shares outstanding, each trading at a price of $10 per
share, there is only $20 million of stock that market participants can buy or sell.  Large
transactions in Alpha Corp. stock are likely to significantly affect its price compared to a
more liquid stock, like IBM shares, over one billion dollars of which are traded each day.
See Roger Clews & David Lodge, Liquidity from a Central Banker’s Perspective, in LIQUIDITY
BLACK HOLES: UNDERSTANDING, QUANTIFYING AND MANAGING FINANCIAL LIQUIDITY RISK 65,
65–69 (Avinash D. Persaud ed., 2003).
86 See infra notes 98–108 and accompanying text. R
87 Specifically, noise traders include those with farfetched theories about how the
stock market works as well as more casual investors like “dentists and doctors in the Mid-
west and the retired individuals in the Sunbelt, for whom ‘following’ their favorite stocks is
a favorite pastime.”  Joseph E. Stiglitz, Using Tax Policy To Curb Speculative Short-Term Trad-
ing, 3 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 101, 105 (1989).
88 See Franklin R. Edwards, Taxing Transactions in Futures Markets: Objectives and Effects,
7 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 75, 77 (1992) (noting that such traders trade on the basis of funda-
mentals and that, where they dominate the market, stock prices are rational).
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profiting as share prices fall (rise) to reflect the shares’ fundamental
values.89
Over time, one would expect informed traders to profit at the
expense of their noisy counterparts.  In a market dominated by infor-
mation traders, share prices should also tend to move toward funda-
mental values, as rational arbitrageurs offset the effect of noise traders
on share price.90  The problem is that risk-averse, rational arbi-
trageurs, with finite time horizons, may not have sufficient interest in
betting over the long term against noise traders.  Noise trading in-
creases stock price volatility—and, without knowing the extent of the
noise trading or how long it will last, greater volatility raises the risk
that informed traders will lose money on arbitrage transactions.91
Moreover, by introducing greater risk into share prices, noise traders
can continue to trade profitably even when their counterparts possess
better information.92  As a result, the quality of the information re-
vealed by share prices may decline and, to that extent, the greater
volatility may lower efficiency in the capital markets.93
89 See Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 532–33 (1986).
90 See Edwards, supra note 88. R
91 See J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON.
703, 705, 712–13 (1990) [hereinafter De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk]; J. Bradford De
Long et al., The Size and Incidence of the Losses from Noise Trading, 44 J. FIN. 681, 681 (1989)
[hereinafter De Long et al., Losses from Noise Trading].  In general, volatility is a measure of
the variation in price of a financial instrument over time.  Volatility, therefore, has much to
recommend it as a proxy for risk. See PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARK-
ABLE STORY OF RISK 260–61 (1996).  An asset that has a wide distribution of possible returns
also has a greater probability of losses (or gains) than an asset with a narrow distribution.
See Richard A. Booth, The Uncertain Case for Regulating Program Trading, 1994 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 1, 14–15 (1994); Lawrence Harris, The Dangers of Regulatory Overreaction to the October
1987 Crash, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 928–32 (1989); G. William Schwert, Stock Market Vola-
tility, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May–June 1990, at 23, 24–27.  In addition, stock market volatility can
affect the real economy—slowing consumer and business spending and increasing the cost
of capital as public confidence in the economy weakens. See Sean Becketti & Gordon H.
Sellon, Jr., Has Financial Market Volatility Increased?, FED. RES. BANK KANSAS CITY ECON. REV.,
June 1989, at 17, 18.
92 See De Long et al., Losses from Noise Trading, supra note 91, at 694; De Long et al., R
Noise Trader Risk, supra note 91, at 713.  As a result, noise trading can fuel a speculative asset R
bubble. See Jose´ A. Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles, 111 J.
POL. ECON. 1183, 1184, 1186 (2003).  Note, however, that it is equally likely that noise
traders will pursue unprofitable strategies at a loss. See Robert Bloomfield et al., How Noise
Trading Affects Markets: An Experimental Analysis, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2275, 2300 (2009).
93 See Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P. Summers, When Financial Markets Work Too
Well: A Cautious Case for a Securities Transactions Tax, 3 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 261, 264–69
(1989); Bin Gu & Lorin M. Hitt, Transaction Costs and Market Efficiency 85, 86 (2001)
(Twenty-Second Int’l Conference on Info. Sys.) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/~lhitt/tcme.pdf. Note that the empirical basis for find-
ing “excessive” market volatility has been questioned. See Mahoney, supra note 82, at R
725–26.  Historically, individual share price volatility, see John Y. Campbell et al., Have Indi-
vidual Stocks Become More Volatile? An Empirical Exploration of Idiosyncratic Risk, 56 J. FIN. 1, 3
(2001), and the frequency of large one-day price movements, see Becketti & Sellon, supra
note 91, at 28, have grown, although overall market volatility has remained largely unaf- R
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FTT proponents argue that a transaction tax will disproportion-
ately affect short-term noise traders who trade frequently (and so will
incur a higher expense).94  Noise traders, therefore, will trade less,
reducing the amount of speculative trading in the marketplace.95  The
result should be a drop in volatility as prices increasingly reflect the
shares’ long-term fundamental values.96  Lower volatility should then
lower the cost of raising capital since investors will be more certain of
the price at which they can resell their holdings.97
FTT opponents note that a new tax will impact market makers by
increasing their cost of doing business, in addition to affecting noise
traders and speculators.  Driving up the cost of market making may
indirectly affect liquidity for all market participants.98  Broadly de-
fined, a market maker’s costs can be divided into three categories:
order processing costs (such as taxes and transfer fees), inventory
costs (such as the costs of hedging), and execution costs (including
the risk that a market maker is trading with a customer who has more
information than it does).99  Higher taxes will increase a market
maker’s processing costs directly.100  In addition, if trading volumes
decline, market makers will have fewer transactions over which to
fected, see Campbell et al., supra, at 3.  Nevertheless, there are a number of factors that may
influence volatility, and it is unclear to what extent any increase in volatility is due to noise
trading. See id. at 37–40.
94 See Stiglitz, supra note 87, at 105–06. R
95 See Scheinkman & Xiong, supra note 92, at 1186–87. R
96 See Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Transaction Taxes and Financial Market Equilibrium, 71
J. BUS. 81, 83–84, 107 (1998).  This argument has its roots in Keynes’ analysis of stock
markets and speculation.  In The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money, Keynes
wrote that, in the New York markets, “the influence of speculation . . . is enor-
mous. . . .  Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise.  But
the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation.”
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 158–59
(1936).  The tendency toward speculation, Keynes argued, was the natural outcome of a
liquid investment market.  Thus, in order to limit speculation, an FTT should be intro-
duced as one means to minimize broad public access to the stock markets. Id. at 159–60.
97 See Stiglitz, supra note 87, at 108–09.  Not all noise trading, however, is bad.  If R
everyone has the same information, there is no reason for one party to sell and the other to
buy the same shares at the same price.  A trading market is unlikely to develop in that case.
See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient
Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 393 (1980).  Noise trading improves liquidity by making
market prices less efficient.  A stock’s price becomes an inexact estimate of its fundamental
value.  Information traders, consequently, have an incentive to buy and sell shares based
on the information they possess and from which they can now privately profit. See Black,
supra note 89, at 531–32; Bloomfield et al., supra note 92, at 2277. R
98 For a description of what a market maker does, see supra note 84 and accompany- R
ing text.
99 See Bruce M. Collins & Frank J. Fabozzi, A Methodology for Measuring Transaction
Costs, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar.–Apr. 1991, at 27, 27–28; G. William Schwert & Paul J. Seguin,
Securities Transaction Taxes: An Overview of Costs, Benefits and Unresolved Questions, FIN. ANA-
LYSTS J., Sept.–Oct. 1993, at 27, 32.
100 See Bloomfield et al., supra note 92. R
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spread fixed costs, potentially increasing their per-transaction fees.101
An FTT can also increase the costs of hedging: market makers that use
derivatives or other financial instruments to manage portfolio risk
may become subject to higher trading costs.102  In addition, if the FTT
is successful, it will drive noise traders from the marketplace.  As a
result, market makers may need to hold securities in inventory for
longer periods, increasing their exposure to changes in share price.
Moreover, by limiting speculation, an FTT raises the probability that
market makers will trade with informed customers.103  The greater
risk that a market maker is buying or selling shares based on less infor-
mation than its counterparts will cause some market makers to quote
a wider bid–ask spread—the price at which they are prepared to buy
and sell securities—in effect, raising the price at which they are willing
to make a market.104
The resulting rise in market-making costs would be expected to
affect most transactions, principally by lowering liquidity and increas-
ing price volatility.  Yet, not all securities would be affected equally.
Even if uniformly applied, an FTT would have a disproportionate ef-
fect on securities that trade more frequently (such as shares included
in an actively traded stock index).105  An FTT, therefore, may cause
some prices to decline relative to fundamental values, widening the
bid–ask spread, in order for the securities to remain an attractive in-
vestment.106  Higher costs can also lower trading volumes and, as a
result, reduce market liquidity.107  Lower levels of liquidity, in turn,
can cause individual trades to have a greater impact on price, as well
as increase market volatility—explaining the positive relationship be-
tween transaction costs and market volatility that some researchers
have observed.108
Thus, as with increases in bank capital, the likely impact of an
FTT on market participants is ambiguous.  FTT proponents argue that
101 The precise effect on trading volume is unclear.  If trading volume continues to be
substantial, as FTT proponents argue, the incremental cost to market makers may not be
significant. See Stiglitz, supra note 87, at 110 (arguing that the market would not be signifi- R
cantly thinner, especially for widely-traded stocks).
102 See Schwert & Seguin, supra note 99. R
103 See id. Note that, since an FTT would apply equally to all market actors, it could
also reduce trading activity equally among noise and informed traders. See Bloomfield et
al., supra note 92, at 2278. R
104 See Harris, supra note 91, at 930–31. R
105 See Schwert & Seguin, supra note 99, at 31–33. R
106 See Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 J. FIN.
ECON. 223, 224 (1986).
107 See Subrahmanyam, supra note 96, at 82–83. R
108 See Christopher J. Green et al., Regulatory Lessons for Emerging Stock Markets from a
Century of Evidence on Transactions Costs and Share Price Volatility in the London Stock Exchange,
24 J. BANKING & FIN. 577, 580–81, 591 (2000); Harald Hau, The Role of Transaction Costs for
Financial Volatility: Evidence from the Paris Bourse, 4 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 862, 886–88 (2006).
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a nominal tax109 will drive out speculators with little or no negative
consequences for market liquidity and volatility.110  Others argue that
even a small increase in trading costs will have a substantial impact.111
Yet, without knowing the effect of an FTT on conduct, or whom it will
affect more,112 it is less than clear what the likely outcome will be.113
C. Credit Default Swaps
A credit default swap, or CDS, is a derivative contract that typi-
cally permits one counterparty to buy or sell from the other all or a
portion of the credit risk tied to a loan or bond.  The CDS customer
pays the “writer” of the swap a periodic fee in exchange for receiving a
contingent payment upon the occurrence of a credit event.  If a credit
event takes place—such as the borrower’s insolvency—the CDS writer
typically must pay the counterparty an amount sufficient to make it
whole or purchase the referenced loan or bond at par.114
The CDS market has grown substantially in the last decade,115
partly in response to the demand for instruments to help lenders
manage their credit exposure116 and minimize the cost of complying
109 See Pollin et al., supra note 79, at 527–28 (discussing the effects of a 0.5 percent R
tax).
110 See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 87, at 110–12. But see Stephen A. Ross, Commentary: R
Using Tax Policy to Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading, 3 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 117, 118 (1989)
(arguing that the purported upside of decreased volatility is ill-defined and possibly
paternalistic).
111 See Ramon P. DeGennaro & Cesare Robotti, Financial Market Frictions, FED. RES.
BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV., Third Quarter 2007, at 1, 13; see also Andrew W. Lo et al., Asset
Prices and Trading Volume Under Fixed Transactions Costs, 112 J. POL. ECON. 1054, 1056 (2004)
(citing several studies reaching this conclusion).
112 See Frank M. Song & Junxi Zhang, Securities Transaction Tax and Market Volatility, 115
ECON. J. 1103, 1105 (2005).
113 See Edwards, supra note 88. R
114 See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 947–49
(2009); see also MORTON GLANTZ, MANAGING BANK RISK: AN INTRODUCTION TO BROAD-BASE
CREDIT ENGINEERING 531–49 (2003) (describing and comparing various types of credit de-
rivatives, including CDS); Blythe Masters & Kelly Bryson, Credit Derivatives and Loan Portfolio
Management, in HANDBOOK OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES 43, 43–85 (Jack Clark Francis et al. eds.,
1999) (same).  CDS, in substance, are economically similar to term insurance policies writ-
ten against the credit downgrade of the referenced borrower. See Stephen J. Lubben,
Credit Derivatives and the Future of Chapter 11, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 405, 411–12 (2007); Frank
Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV.
1019, 1050 (2007).
115 By June 2008, an estimated $62 trillion in notional amount of CDS were outstand-
ing, up from $900 billion in 2000. See Gretchen Morgenson, First Comes the Swap. Then It’s
the Knives., N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2008, at BU1.
116 See Bernadette Minton et al., How Much Do Banks Use Credit Derivatives To Reduce Risk
3–5, 21 (Ohio State Univ., Fisher Coll. Bus., Working Paper No. 2006-03-001, 2006), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=785364; David Mengle, Head of Res., Int’l Swaps & Deriva-
tives Ass’n, Presentation at the Financial Markets Conference of Fed. Reserve Bank of
Atlanta: Credit Derivatives: An Overview, at 2 (May 15, 2007), available at http://www.
frbatlanta.org/news/conferen/07fmc/07FMC_mengle_present.pdf (unpublished
PowerPoint).
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with regulatory capital requirements,117 as well as in response to the
interest by some investors in outright risk taking.118  Beginning in the
1980s, bank lenders syndicated loans in order to help manage their
credit risk exposure, spurring growth in the private credit market and
secondary trading in loan assets.119  This approach, however, required
investors to purchase interests in the loans themselves—committing
working capital as well as taking on the credit risk of the borrowers,
which limited the universe of prospective investors.  CDS offered an
attractive alternative.  Credit derivatives could separate the funding
obligation of a loan or bond from its credit risk.  Thus, by using a
CDS, a bank could buy or sell all or a portion of a borrower’s credit
risk without transferring the loan or bond itself, typically enabling it to
more efficiently manage and diversify its credit exposure.120  In addi-
tion, CDS have improved liquidity in the bond market: dealers who
make a market in bonds can manage their credit risk using CDS, ena-
bling them to continue to actively deal.121
Since the CDS market has been largely private and since some
borrowers are reluctant to see interests in their loans sold to others, it
is unclear how often lenders use derivatives to hedge credit risk.  To
date, the CDS market has remained concentrated among a small
group of large banks,122 which may reflect the limited number of ref-
erence entities against which swaps are written, making that market
117 See Robert F. Schwartz, Risk Distribution in the Capital Markets: Credit Default Swaps,
Insurance and a Theory of Demarcation, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 167, 175 (2007)
(describing function and use of CDS).
118 See Kathryn Chen et al., An Analysis of CDS Transactions: Implications for Public Report-
ing 2 (Fed. Res. Bank N.Y., Staff Report No. 517, 2011), available at http://www.newyork
fed.org/research/staff_reports/sr517.html; see also Darrell Duffie, Innovations in Credit Risk
Transfer: Implications for Financial Stability 4–5 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper
No. 255, 2008), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work255.pdf (outlining the credit
risk transfer activity of several large banks).
119 See Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the Credit Market, and
Corporate Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 656–57 (2009).
120 See JOHN B. CAOUETTE ET AL., MANAGING CREDIT RISK: THE NEXT GREAT FINANCIAL
CHALLENGE 311–12 (1998); GLANTZ, supra note 114, at 532; Angus Duncan, Loan-Only Credit R
Default Swaps: The March to Liquidity, COM. LENDING REV., Sept.–Oct. 2006, at 15, 15–16; see
also Hamish Risk, Loan Credit-Default Swaps Surge as Hedge Funds Hunger for Yield, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 22, 2006), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a4fg_8Gw
37Fw&refer=home (noting that “[w]hen investors can’t get the loans, they’re increasingly
using credit-default swaps”). But see Minton et al., supra note 116, at 7 (noting that many R
banks were reluctant to use CDS at first and that classic bank lending still dwarfs CDS
trading).
121 See Oversight Hearing on Bond Market Regulation Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous.
& Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 6 (2004), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/in
dex.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=029e4232-9b89-45d6-9404-37f220bb0175
(statement of Micah S. Green, President, Bond Market Association).
122 See Minton et al., supra note 116, at 2–4, 7. R
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less relevant to small lenders.123  Nevertheless, trading in credit deriva-
tives has continued to grow, and there are indications that the use of
credit derivatives to diversify credit risk has become more common.124
Section 727 of the Dodd-Frank Act125 amended the Commodity
Exchange Act by inserting section 2(a)(13), which requires swap price
and volume data to be reported “as soon as technologically practica-
ble after the time at which the swap transaction has been executed”126
and “in such form and at such times as the [Commodity Futures Trad-
ing] Commission determines appropriate to enhance price discov-
ery.”127  The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) was
also directed to implement rules that, among other things, “take into
account whether the public disclosure will materially reduce market
liquidity.”128  Under the new rules, swap transactions must be re-
ported to a swap data repository, which must make the information
publicly available as soon as technologically practicable.129  Reports
for certain block trades and large notional swap transactions are sub-
ject to a reporting delay based on the type of market participant, the
method of execution, and the asset class traded.130
There has been some debate over the likely effect of public trade
reporting on the CDS market.  Market participants argue that public
disclosure, even if delayed, may put them at risk from competitors
123 See Benedikt Goderis et al., Bank Behaviour with Access to Credit Risk Transfer Markets
8–9 (Bank of Fin. Res., Discussion Paper No. 4, 2007), available at http://www.bof.fi/NR/
rdonlyres/801B7C28-819B-4A72-877A-0926F00563D1/0/0704netti.pdf.  The CDS industry
introduced new market trading conventions in 2009 (referred to as the “Big Bang Proto-
col”) in order to standardize and potentially increase trading in most single-name CDS
products. See generally Big Bang Protocol: Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVA-
TIVE ASS’N, http://www.isda.org/bigbangprot/bbprot_faq.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
124 See Viral V. Acharya & Timothy C. Johnson, Insider Trading in Credit Derivatives, 84 J.
FIN. ECON. 110, 111 (2007); Duffie, supra note 118, at 4–5; Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard R
Black, Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, 14 EUR.
FIN. MGMT. 663, 682 (2008); Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 114, at 1034; DEBTWIRE, NORTH R
AMERICAN DISTRESSED DEBT MARKET OUTLOOK 2008 14 (2008), http://www.debtwire.com/
library.marketview?DocID=1083.
125 Dodd-Frank Act § 727, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified at
7 U.S.C. § 2) (amending the Commodity Exchange Act).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Real-Time Public Reporting of Swap Transaction Data, 77 Fed. Reg. 1182, 1201
(Jan. 9, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 43).
130 See id. at 1216.  The time delays range from fifteen minutes to forty-eight business
hours. See id. at 1264–65.  They are the same on an interim basis for all swaps within a
particular category, regardless of size, until the CFTC determines appropriate minimum
block sizes. See id. at 1216, 1247.  The CFTC has also proposed criteria for determining
swap categories, methodologies to set the appropriate minimum block sizes, and limita-
tions on the public disclosure of certain swap transaction and pricing data. See Procedures
to Establish Appropriate Minimum Block Sizes for Large Notional Off-Facility Swaps and
Block Trades, 77 Fed. Reg. 15,460 (Mar. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 43).
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who anticipate their need to hedge.131  Those competitors may trade
ahead of their hedging activity, causing market prices to move ad-
versely to the hedger, potentially raising the cost of CDS trading and
lowering liquidity.132
The view that greater transparency can negatively affect the credit
markets, however, runs contrary to the accepted wisdom among politi-
cians,133 regulators,134 and academics.135  Moreover, it is inconsistent
with research to date on the corporate bond market.  Prior to 2002,
corporate bonds traded principally in the over-the-counter market
with limited public disclosure of any trading information.  Beginning
in 2002, all broker-dealers were required to report trade prices, quan-
tities, and other information through the Trade Reporting and Com-
pliance Engine (TRACE) system.  The resulting transparency had a
neutral or positive effect on bond liquidity and, since investors had
more information, it also resulted in a greater ability to negotiate
terms with dealers and lower trading costs.136
Greater transparency also had some notable side effects.  Histori-
cally, dealers held an inventory of bonds in which they would make a
131 See Katy Burne, N.Y. Fed Study Suggests Swaps Overhauls Need to Be Nuanced, WALL ST.
J. (Sept. 27, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702048313045765969
31512434352.html.
132 See Real-Time Public Reporting of Swap Transaction Data, 77 Fed. Reg. 1213 (dis-
cussing concerns about front running of large transactions); see also supra notes 98–108 and R
accompanying text (discussion of trading costs and liquidity).
133 For example, one of the express goals of the Dodd-Frank Act was to increase trans-
parency in the derivatives market. See Press Release, H. Comm. Fin. Servs. - Democrats,
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (June 29, 2010), available at
http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/press/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=1306 (noting
that the Dodd-Frank Act “[r]equires data collection and publication through clearing
houses or swap repositories to improve market transparency”).
134 As CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler testified, “Some have legitimately debated
whether [the] lack of transparency was a contributing factor to the financial crisis.  I be-
lieve that . . . this lack of transparency did leave our financial system more vulnerable.”
Gary Gensler, Chairman, CFTC, Testimony to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
(July 1, 2010), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opa
gensler-48; see also Christopher Cox, Op-Ed., Swapping Secrecy for Transparency, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 2008, at WK12 (arguing that Congress needs to make the CDS market more trans-
parent to help regulators uncover fraudulent practices).
135 See, e.g., Andrew W. Lo, Regulatory Reform in the Wake of the Financial Crisis of
2007–2008, 1 J. FIN. ECON. POL’Y 4, 18 (2009) (arguing for substantial reforms of the CDS
market, including increased transparency); Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 114, at 1047 (sug- R
gesting reforms such as making all credit derivative information free on the internet, re-
quiring SEC filings of credit derivative information, creating a centralized credit derivative
platform, and requiring companies to disclose credit derivative holdings in narrative
form).
136 See Hendrik Bessembinder & William Maxwell, Transparency and the Corporate Bond
Market, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 217, 225–27 (2008); Amy K. Edwards et al., Corporate Bond Market
Transaction Costs and Transparency, 62 J. FIN. 1421, 1422–23 (2007); Michael A. Goldstein et
al., Transparency and Liquidity: A Controlled Experiment on Corporate Bonds, 20 REV. FIN. STUD.
235, 237–38 (2007).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\97-5\CRN506.txt unknown Seq: 27  5-JUL-12 15:39
2012] THE GOLDILOCKS APPROACH 1293
market.137  With TRACE, it was possible for competitors to know when
a dealer held a substantial amount of a particular security.  Those
competitors, therefore, might trade ahead of the dealer’s efforts to
sell or hedge its bonds, causing prices to move against it.  Dealers,
therefore, became more reluctant to hold large bond inventories.  For
that reason, trading became more difficult after the TRACE system
was introduced—bond traders now needed to contact multiple deal-
ers in order to purchase a large quantity of bonds.138  Dealers may
have also become reluctant to trade as principals, placing customer
orders on an agency basis in order to minimize their own risk and also
lowering liquidity.139
Greater disclosure in the CDS market is likely to help level the
playing field between investors and dealers.  Yet, like the corporate
bond market, it may push dealers toward adopting an agency business
model.140  In addition, greater disclosure may decrease liquidity due
to its impact on dealer hedging.  A recent study by the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York found that, although there is a broad level of
participation in the CDS market, most CDS do not trade frequently,
underscoring the importance of market makers—who are willing to
assume the risk of a less-traded asset and hold it for some time—in
ensuring market liquidity.141  The study also found that block trades
between dealers and customers typically are not hedged quickly, with
dealers often trading out of their risk a day or more after the original
transaction.142  Accordingly, CDS dealers—like their counterparts in
the bond market—are concerned that public knowledge of a transac-
tion will give competitors a chance to trade in advance of any hedging
activity, potentially increasing the cost of hedging.  Dealers, conse-
quently, may become unable to manage their own risks in a cost-effec-
tive way.  The New York Fed study, therefore, concluded that the
resulting rise in hedging costs could lower market making, dampen
CDS liquidity, and potentially raise CDS costs to customers.143
Thus, the effect of transparency on the CDS market is uncertain.
Recognizing this, reporting delays under the new CFTC rules have
been adopted on an interim basis for all swap transactions, regardless
137 A description of market making and liquidity appears supra notes 98–108 and ac- R
companying text.
138 See Bessembinder & Maxwell, supra note 136, at 223, 228–29. R
139 See id. at 228; see also Gordon Gemmill, Transparency and Liquidity: A Study of Block
Trades on the London Stock Exchange Under Different Publication Rules, 51 J. FIN. 1765, 1766–67
(1996) (noting that delayed publication does not improve liquidity).
140 See Katy Burne, Reforms Have Swap Dealers and Brokers Considering Agency Model, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20111013-715009.html (avail-
able only to subscribers).
141 See Chen et al., supra note 118, at 10. R
142 See id. at 16.
143 See id. at 16–18.
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of amount, until the CFTC determines the appropriate minimum
block sizes over which reporting will be delayed.144  Those minimum
block sizes will be based on data the CFTC obtains during an initial
phase-in period,145 with the expectation that roughly two-thirds of
CDS transactions will be reported on a real-time basis, without de-
lay.146  Reflecting dealer concerns over anonymity, the CFTC has also
proposed rules to help mask the total amount of a swap transaction
that equals or exceeds the applicable minimum block size.147
Two potential outcomes are possible, both of which are consis-
tent with experience in the bond market.  The first predicts that trans-
parency will enhance competition, forcing a decline in trading costs
that benefits market participants.  The second suggests that greater
transparency—even if it provides customers with more bargaining lev-
erage—may still result in higher trading costs as dealers offset the
greater risk of hedging.  For some dealers, the risk may be too high,
resulting in a decline in CDS liquidity.  A slowdown in the CDS mar-
ket, in turn, may affect customers—such as banks and other regulated
entities—that rely on CDS to help manage their credit risk.148  Regu-
lating CDS disclosure, therefore, leaves open a question beyond the
144 See Real-Time Public Reporting of Swap Transaction Data, 77 Fed. Reg. 1182,
1215–16 (Jan. 9, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 43).  The CFTC noted that five
commenters had recommended the adoption of “tiered time delays based on average daily
trading volume or minimum block size,” reflecting the potential impact of disclosure on
trading and hedging. See id. at 1216.  The CFTC acknowledged that it may be appropriate
for less liquid swaps to become subject to longer time delays. See id. at 1218.
145 See Procedures to Establish Appropriate Minimum Block Sizes for Large Notional
Off-Facility Swaps and Block Trades, 77 Fed Reg. 15,460, 15,466–67 (Mar. 15, 2012) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 43).
146 Id. at 15,480.  For the proposed methodology to calculate minimum block sizes for
CDS, see 77 Fed Reg. at 15,479–80.
147 Id. at 15,490.
148 Bank of America has estimated that, in 2006, approximately 13% of the CDS mar-
ket—equal to $3.2 trillion in notional amount—involved the net transfer of credit risk
away from banks’ loan portfolios. See Duffie, supra note 118.  For banks, the benefits have R
been substantial—enabling them to manage and diversify credit risk at lower cost than
before. See Katerina Simons, Why Do Banks Syndicate Loans?, NEW ENG. ECON. REV.,
Jan.–Feb. 1993, at 45, 45–47 (noting that loan syndications and other forms of secondary
intermediation permit banks to reduce exposure to individual borrowers and reduce un-
wanted risk concentrations); Rebecca S. Demsetz, Bank Loan Sales: A New Look at the Motiva-
tions for Secondary Market Activity 22–23 (Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 69, 1999),
available at http://www.newyorkfedeconomists.org/research/staff_reports/sr69.pdf (not-
ing that loan syndications and other credit risk transfers permit banks to diversify their
holdings which, in turn, allows banks to realize benefits—including increased profitabil-
ity—not available to less diversified banks).  Borrowers are likely to have benefited as well.
A portion of the gains can be passed on, for example, through increased lending limits or
lower interest rates, resulting in an overall decline in a borrower’s real cost of capital. See
A. Burak Gu¨ner, Loan Sales and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing, 19 REV. FIN. STUD. 687, 713
(2006) (finding that corporate loans that are originated for sale have lower yields than
traditional corporate loans because they have a lower cost of funding for banks than tradi-
tional loans); George G. Pennacchi, Loan Sales and the Cost of Bank Capital, 43 J. FIN. 375,
375–76, 393 (1988) (suggesting that the reduced finance and capital costs that banks can
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\97-5\CRN506.txt unknown Seq: 29  5-JUL-12 15:39
2012] THE GOLDILOCKS APPROACH 1295
CDS market: Will greater transparency affect other sectors of the fi-
nancial system?  Without knowing its effect on CDS market makers, it
is difficult to anticipate what the full impact will be.
II
STAGED REGULATION AND THE GOLDILOCKS APPROACH
Uncertainty around new financial regulation can draw into ques-
tion its value in minimizing risk.  Each of the foregoing examples—
bank risk taking, transaction taxes, and CDS disclosure—suggests that
risk-related regulation can be valuable but may also have unantici-
pated outcomes.  The key question is whether new rules can be intro-
duced that effectively address the risks they are designed to regulate
while minimizing the negative side effects.  I refer to this balance as
the “Goldilocks approach”—weighing new rules against new risks that
potentially eclipse the regulatory benefits.  Regulation, in the Goldi-
locks world, should not be too strong or too weak but should strike a
balance that is “just right.”  Attempting to do so with limited informa-
tion may be difficult in light of the growing complexity of the finan-
cial system.  Better information is required.  To the extent it addresses
that need, new risk regulation, therefore, may benefit from staging
rather than the introduction of a full array of new rules at once.
At its heart, the Goldilocks approach relies on a real options
method of new regulation—staging new rules in order to provide reg-
ulators with additional information regarding their effect on market
conduct and, as necessary, adjusting those rules to reflect any unantic-
ipated consequences.  Real options theory, in the transactional world,
is based on the insight that investment opportunities can be analyzed
as options that managers choose to exercise or forego.  Rather than
committing to, and incurring the related (and potentially irreversible)
costs of, a particular strategy, managers can adjust their approach
based on new information they acquire over time.  Permitting new
rules to be adjusted to reflect market feedback can assist in minimiz-
ing uncertainty over the rules’ benefits, as well as lower the likelihood
that regulation will be ineffective or result in unanticipated costs.149
Consider, for example, a firm’s decision whether or not to invest
in a new copper mining project.  Assume that the real property is un-
developed, that the money used to purchase and develop the property
is unrecoverable after it is spent, and that future returns on the pro-
duction and sale of copper are uncertain.  In general, to value the
realize through loan sales permit them to lend to a greater number of borrowers, includ-
ing riskier borrowers).
149 See Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, Optimal Timing of Legal Intervention: The Role of
Timing Rules, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 18, 19–20 (2009), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/
media/pdf/luppi_parisi.pdf.
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project using a traditional discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis, the
firm’s managers would estimate the cash flow from future sales of cop-
per and discount that estimate to its present value.  The discount rate
would reflect, among other things, the risk of the cash flow being real-
ized (for example, due to future fluctuations in the world’s copper
price).  The result would then be compared to the project’s required
expenditures, and, if positive, the firm would expect to increase its
value by making the investment.150
The DCF analysis, while commonly used to assess new projects,151
misses some important points.  First, it bundles all stages of the project
together as one.  It fails to reflect the series of options available to the
firm in developing the new mine and, as necessary, making mid-
course corrections in its strategy.152  From an options perspective, buy-
ing the property grants the firm the option to explore it; following
exploration, new information gives the firm a better basis to decide
whether or not to develop it; and investing in development provides
the firm with the option to extract copper (and, going forward, the
option to abandon the project if it becomes unprofitable).153
Second, because the project is a series of options, the firm can
defer its investment or adjust its development in order to maximize
profits.154  Those options have value, which is typically not reflected in
a DCF analysis,155 so long as the firm can adjust its strategy (at rela-
tively low cost) based on the new information it acquires.156  Likewise,
the firm’s decision not to exercise an option—to postpone develop-
ment of the project until a later date—has a cost.  Delaying construc-
tion postpones the firm’s realization of value, and that cost must be
balanced against the benefit of waiting before moving to the project’s
next stage.157
Finally, using a DCF analysis, a firm that chooses between two
projects may select the one with lower anticipated cash flows if there is
a greater probability of receiving such cash flows.  Doing so, however,
150 See Timothy A. Luehrman, Investment Opportunities as Real Options: Getting Started on
the Numbers, HARV. BUS. REV., Jul.–Aug. 1998, at 51, 52; Thomas A. Smith, Real Options and
Takeovers, 52 EMORY L.J. 1815, 1821–22 (2003).
151 See Margaret E. Slade, Valuing Managerial Flexibility: An Application of Real-Option The-
ory to Mining Investments, 41 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 193, 195 (2001).
152 See Tom Copeland & Peter Tufano, A Real-World Way to Manage Real Options, HARV.
BUS. REV., Mar. 2004, at 90, 92.
153 See Slade, supra note 151, at 196–97. R
154 This assumes that the firm exercises its options in a manner that maximizes value.
It is possible that management will miscalculate when best to go forward—rather than, for
example, waiting to gain further information about the project—and, as a result, fail to
realize the options’ full value. See Copeland & Tufano, supra note 152, at 91. R
155 See Smith, supra note 150, at 1823. R
156 See Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 524–27 (2008);
Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 859–60 (2006).
157 See Smith, supra note 150, at 1824; Luppi & Parisi, supra note 149, at 19–20. R
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may fail to take account of the benefits of options.  At each stage, the
money the firm invests in the project can be considered the purchase
price of a related option.  If the firm can switch strategies at low cost—
in other words, if it can exercise its option to go forward or, at mini-
mal cost, modify or forego the project—it may be more valuable for
the firm to pursue a project with higher anticipated cash flows, even
though there is a greater risk at the outset that they will not be real-
ized.  The firm will be able to adjust its management strategy, based
on the new knowledge it acquires over time, to address prospective
issues as they arise.158
Regulators often attempt to assess the impact of new rules on reg-
ulated activity as part of a cost-benefit analysis.159  Like the DCF ap-
158 See Listokin, supra note 156, at 525; Slade, supra note 151, at 202–03.  In addition, R
once the firm decides to go forward with a stage of the project, it will give up the remain-
ing value of the associated option.  That loss should also be taken into account even
though it is typically not included in a DCF valuation.  See Kenneth J. Arrow & Anthony C.
Fisher, Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty, and Irreversibility, 88 Q.J. ECON. 312, 319
(1974); Slade, supra note 151, at 196; Smith, supra note 150, at 1823. R
159 See Listokin, supra note 156, at 500.  Note that some federal agencies are required R
to assess the economic effects of significant new rules.  The Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), in Circular A-4, set out how those costs and benefits should be measured
and reported.  Circular A-4 from OMB to the Heads of Executive Agencies and Establish-
ments (Sept. 17, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4.
As independent regulatory agencies, however, federal financial regulators are not required
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706, 1305, 3105, 3344,
4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (2006), to conduct the same cost-benefit analysis when they adopt
new regulations, see Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011) (supple-
menting Executive Order 12,866 and setting forward general regulatory requirements);
Exec. Order No. 13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204 (2002) (making minor changes to terms of Executive
Order 12,866); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,737 (Oct. 4, 1993) (ex-
cluding from the rule “any authority . . . considered to be independent regulatory agen-
cies, as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(10)”), although Executive Order 13,579 more recently
has encouraged them to comply with Executive Order 13,563, see Exec. Order No. 13,579,
76 Fed. Reg. 41,587 (July 14, 2011).  Some financial regulators are separately required to
consider the impact, costs, and benefits of new rules but without a prescribed methodol-
ogy. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-151, DODD-FRANK ACT REGULATIONS:
IMPLEMENTATION COULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND COORDINATION 10–12
(2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/586210.pdf.  Federal financial regula-
tors have represented to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) that they follow
Circular A-4’s guidance “in principle or spirit,” see id. at 14, even though the GAO did find
that regulators’ policies did not fully follow the OMB’s guidance during the early stages of
implementing the Dodd-Frank Act, see id. at 14–18.  More recently, the Inspector General
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) criticized the SEC’s cost-benefit review
of new Dodd-Frank Act regulations, finding that the SEC sometimes used “multiple base-
lines [in its cost-benefit analyses] that [were] difficult to define or internally inconsistent.”
SEC, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES IN SELECTED
SEC DODD-FRANK ACT RULEMAKINGS, REPORT NO. 49, 23 (2012), available at http://www.sec-
oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2012/499.pdf.  In response, the SEC has developed
internal guidance that directs its staff to undertake a more comprehensive economic analy-
sis of new regulations during the rulemaking process. See Jessica Holzer & Andrew Acker-
man, SEC Addressing Gaps in Analysis, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2012, at C3.  CFTC
Commissioner Scott O’Malia has also been critical of the CFTC’s “fail[ure] to meet basic
standards in analyzing the costs and benefits of its rulemakings.”  Scott D. O’Malia,
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proach, a cost-benefit analysis measures the direct benefits of new
regulation without valuing options or the incremental learning that a
staged approach can create.  Suppose, for example, a regulator is
faced with two alternative rules—each with different degrees of re-
striction.  Assume that the “conservative” rule is less likely to raise un-
anticipated consequences but also is unlikely to be as effective as the
“aggressive” rule, which has a greater chance of raising other issues.
The regulator’s choice, of course, is not irreversible.  A poor decision,
or a new rule with unanticipated consequences, can be reversed at a
later stage—but, potentially, at substantial expense.  That expense can
include the sunk costs of implementing and complying with the prior
rule, as well as the negative impact of poor regulation on the financial
markets (and, potentially, the real economy).160  At a high cost, it
would make sense for the regulator to adopt the conservative rule—
one with a lower risk of a negative outcome—even if the alternative
potentially has better results.  The conservative rule would minimize
the risk of incurring those costs even though it may not be optimal.161
Dividing regulation into stages can help resolve this tension.  In-
troducing a new rule over time can minimize uncertainty about its
Comm’r, CFTC, Almost Certainly MSU (making stuff up), Remarks at the Eighth Annual
Energy Trading Conference, Bauer College Global Energy Management Institute, Univer-
sity of Houston, Mar. 23, 2012, available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Speeches
Testimony/opaomalia-12.  Those failures may partly reflect the basic difficulty of measur-
ing the costs and benefits of new regulation in an evolving financial services industry. See
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-32, FINANCIAL REGULATION: INDUSTRY TRENDS
CONTINUE TO CHALLENGE THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 3–6 (2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0832.pdf.  The result is that financial regulation often
falls short of the rigorous analysis applied by other federal agencies. See Edward Sherwin,
The Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Lessons from the SEC’s Stalled Mutual Fund
Reform Effort, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 2 (2006); see also Letter from CCMR to Senators
Timothy Johnson and Richard Shelby and Representatives Spencer Bachus and Barney,
Lack of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Dodd-Frank Rulemaking (Mar. 7, 2012) [hereinafter
CCMR Letter], available at http://capmktsreg.org/2012/03/lack-of-cost-benefit-analysis-in-
dodd-frank-rulemaking/ (letter by independent committee of financial experts criticizing
“the inadequacy of cost-benefit analysis in proposed and final rulemakings” under the
Dodd-Frank Act).  Recent initiatives have sought to narrow the disparity, although
whether, as a practical matter, a cost-benefit analysis of financial regulation is possible re-
mains to be seen.  In September 2011, Senator Richard Shelby, the senior Republican on
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, introduced the Financial
Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2011, see Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2011,
S. 1615, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/
S1615.pdf, which would prevent a federal agency from introducing any notice of proposed
rulemaking until it has completed a “quantitative and qualitative assessment of all antici-
pated direct and indirect costs and benefits” of the proposed rule, see id. § 3(a)(4), and
prohibit any agency from “publish[ing] a notice of final rulemaking if the
agency . . . determines that the quantified costs are greater than the quantified benefits,”
see id. § 3(b)(4)(A).
160 See FRANCESCO PARISI & VINCY FON, THE ECONOMICS OF LAWMAKING 35–36 (2009)
(describing the sunk costs of lawmaking).
161 See Listokin, supra note 156, at 527–29. R
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future costs and benefits so long as regulators can modify the rule to
reflect concerns that arise with new information.162  The result may be
more effective—and targeted—regulation than under a traditional
cost-benefit analysis.
A staged approach, however, may not be appropriate for all regu-
lation.  If regulators are uncertain how to address a particular risk,
and there are two or more competing proposals to do so, it may be
costly to stage the implementation of the first proposal and then, mid-
stream, switch to a second.  The less costly alternative, in that case,
may be to adopt a regulation from the outset that is less likely to raise
other problems even if it is also less likely to be as effective.  The key is
to determine the cost of staging relative to its benefits and compare
the outcome to the alternatives.163  With an FTT, for example, a regu-
lator could initially implement a marginal FTT, or apply it to a subset
of financial instruments, as part of a staging process.  Staging would
be appropriate if the regulator could then modify the FTT, at rela-
tively low cost, with the experience it gains from introducing the ini-
tial tax, taking into account its impact (if any) on liquidity.164
Another example is the Volcker Rule.165  The new Rule prohibits
a banking entity166 from “engag[ing] in proprietary trading” or “ac-
quir[ing] or retain[ing] any equity, partnership, or other ownership
interest in or sponsor[ing] a hedge fund or a private equity fund,”167
162 See Sunstein, supra note 156, at 859. R
163 See Listokin, supra note 156, at 489–90. R
164 The potential problems of implementing a full FTT from the outset are described
supra notes 98–108 and accompanying text. R
165 Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (Supp. IV 2010).  The Volcker Rule reflects the
populist view that during the period leading up to the financial crisis proprietary trading
distracted banks from their fiduciary obligations to clients as well as from their core func-
tion of providing long-term credit to families and businesses.  It was motivated, in part, by a
desire to force banks to return to a traditional banking model—to create a static regulatory
divide between commercial and investment banking, thereby insulating traditional bank
functions, such as taking deposits and making loans, from proprietary trading.  I describe
the Volcker Rule, and issues surrounding its implementation, in more detail in Charles K.
Whitehead, The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial Markets, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 40–43
(2011).
166 “Banking entity” is defined in section 13(h)(1) of the Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956.  12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (amended by section 619 of the Dodd-
Frank Act).  The term includes any insured depository institution (other than certain lim-
ited purpose trust institutions), any company that controls an insured depository institu-
tion, any company that is treated as a bank holding company for purposes of section 8 of
the International Banking Act of 1978, see 12 U.S.C. § 3106, and any affiliate of any of the
foregoing. 12 U.S.C. § 1851.
167 Id. § 1851(a). The Volcker Rule defines a “hedge fund” and a “private equity fund”
broadly to be any entity “that would be an investment company, as defined in the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act, or such similar
funds as the appropriate Federal banking agencies, the [SEC], [or] the [CFTC]” deter-
mine should be treated as a hedge fund or private equity fund. § 1851(h)(2) (citation
omitted).
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subject to certain exceptions and permitted activities.168  Among the
permitted activities, market making169 is perhaps the most important.
Drawing a line between prohibited trading and market making may
be difficult to do in practice170—a potential problem in light of the
importance of market making to capital-raising.171  Investors contact
168 Certain proprietary trading activities are still permitted under the Volcker Rule,
§ 1851(d)(1)—including trading in U.S. government securities, § 1851(d)(1)(A), market
making, § 1851(d)(1)(B), and hedging to mitigate risk, § 1851(d)(1)(C)—although the
full scope of permitted activities remains to be finalized.  Also excluded from the Rule is
proprietary trading conducted solely outside the United States by an entity not directly or
indirectly controlled by a U.S. bank or systemically important firm. See § 1851(d)(1)(H).
In addition, the Rule authorizes regulators to carve out trading activities if they “promote
and protect the safety and soundness” of the firm and U.S. financial stability.
§ 1851(d)(1)(J).  An otherwise permitted activity, however, is still prohibited if it will result
in “a material conflict of interest” with clients or “a material exposure . . . to high-risk assets
or high-risk trading strategies.” § 1851(d)(2)(A)(i)–(ii).  Permitted activities may be sub-
ject to additional capital requirements and other limitations if determined to be “appropri-
ate to protect the safety and soundness” of the firms engaged in such activities. See
§ 1851(d)(3).
169 See § 1851(d)(1)(B).
170 As the notice of proposed rulemaking under the Volcker Rule describes:
It may be difficult to distinguish principal positions that appropriately sup-
port market making-related activities from positions taken for short-term,
speculative purposes.  In particular, it may be difficult to determine
whether principal risk has been retained because (i) the retention of such
risk is necessary to provide intermediation and liquidity services for a rele-
vant financial instrument or (ii) the position is part of a speculative trading
strategy designed to realize profits from price movements in retained prin-
cipal risk.
Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Rela-
tionships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846, 68,869 (Nov. 7,
2011).
171 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.  Market making is a response to the need R
in today’s world for market and funding liquidity. Market liquidity refers to the ease by
which an investor can sell a portfolio asset, like a stock or a bond.  An asset’s market liquid-
ity is low when it becomes relatively difficult to raise money by selling the asset—where, in
effect, there are sellers but relatively few buyers, resulting in a drop in sale price.  Anticipat-
ing that risk, investors are more likely to demand a higher return on their investment; the
greater the risk, the greater the overall cost of raising capital. Funding liquidity refers to the
ability of investors and other market participants to finance their investment portfolios.
Many investors use the assets they buy as collateral against short-term borrowings, often
structured as sales and repurchases in the “repo” market.  If an investor, for example, buys
Asset A for 100, it can in effect post Asset A as collateral against a loan of 97.  The remain-
der of the purchase price—referred to as a “haircut,” in this example, of 3—must be fi-
nanced using the investor’s own capital, which is typically more expensive than repo.  The
size of the haircut is a reflection of the lender’s ability to sell collateral if the borrower
defaults.  Thus, a decline in market liquidity is likely to increase the haircut.  It also limits
how much the investor can borrow and, therefore, its profitability—most likely prompting
investors to demand a greater return on the assets they buy. See Markus K. Brunnermeier
& Lasse Heje Pedersen, Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2201,
2201–07 (2009); Gorton, supra note 41, at 33–38.  Stated differently, market and funding R
liquidity are two sides of the same coin.  If market liquidity declines, the resulting rise in
haircuts will lower the amounts available to buy new assets, in turn, prompting a further
drop in market liquidity.  This feedback loop is precisely what occurred during the 2008
financial crisis, resulting in a rapid decline in market and funding liquidity. See Brun-
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market makers, such as banks, daily to trade billions of dollars of fi-
nancial instruments.  As a result, banks may acquire inventory and
maintain risk exposures in order to meet (or anticipate) customer de-
mand.  Proprietary traders, likewise, accumulate positions with the ex-
pectation of profiting from future transactions.  Both involve principal
trading with customers or counterparties, where the firm may gain or
lose as a result of short-term changes in asset price.172
Proposed regulations to implement the Volcker Rule set out the
criteria a banking entity must meet in order for its market-making ac-
tivities to be permissible.  Those criteria turn, in part, on quantitative
measures that each bank must maintain and report.173  In addition,
the regulations define the key characteristics of permissible market
making,174 although they recognize that the precise nature of those
activities will vary depending, in part, on the financial instruments be-
ing traded and the location and liquidity of the relevant market.175
The regulations are complex,176 and implementing them is likely to
nermeier & Pedersen, supra, at 2203–05.  Short of crisis, however, the relationship between
market and funding liquidity can still limit the amount of new capital that is available to
end users—those who rely on the capital markets to raise funds—or increase the overall
cost of funding.  More to the point, investors purchase securities on the basis of there
being an adequate secondary market for resale, which largely depends on market-making
activities.  Unless an alternative source of liquidity appears, a decline in market making is
likely to increase portfolio risk and either reduce returns to investors or increase the issu-
ers’ cost of capital, or both. See Darrell Duffie, Market Making Under the Proposed Volcker Rule
18–19 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper Series No. 106, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990472.
172 See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in,
and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. at 68,869; see
also FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROHIBITIONS ON
PROPRIETARY TRADING & CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE FUNDS & PRIVATE EQUITY
FUNDS 18–25 (2011) [hereinafter FSOC STUDY], available at http://www.treasury.gov/initia
tives/Documents/Volcker%20sec%20%20619%20study%20final%201%2018%2011%2
0rg.pdf (noting that current market making often includes elements of proprietary trading
and that, coupled with differences in market making for different assets and markets, de-
lineating between permissible and impermissible trading is challenging).
173 See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in,
and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. at 68,869,
68,882–84.  The Dodd-Frank Act directed the Financial Stability Oversight Council to un-
dertake a study of the Volcker Rule, including recommendations regarding its implemen-
tation, which was published on January 18, 2011. See Dodd-Frank Act, § 1851(b)(1); see also
FSOC STUDY, supra note 172, at 8–9 (describing the statutory mandate and objectives of the R
FSOC Study).  A key recommendation was the use of quantitative metrics to aid regulators
in distinguishing impermissible proprietary trading from permitted activities and to facili-
tate the comparison of trading activity across different banks. See id. at 37.  Metrics will also
help banking entities comply more easily with the Volcker Rule, but in addition, they are
likely to require banks to change how they do business in order to comply with the regula-
tors’ definition of permitted activities. See id. at 5–6.
174 See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in,
and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. at 68,890–91.
175 See id. at 68,871–72.
176 See James B. Stewart, Volcker Rule, Once Simple, Now Boggles, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2011,
at B1.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\97-5\CRN506.txt unknown Seq: 36  5-JUL-12 15:39
1302 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1267
be expensive.177  Regulators, moreover, are split over how best to final-
ize the Rule’s requirements—prompting over 1,300 queries in the re-
lease proposing the new regulations, many of which reflect issues the
regulators could not resolve among themselves.178  Consequently, a
staged approach to implementing the Rule—incorporating its impact
on, for example, market making—may be more effective than efforts
to finalize it from the outset.  Introducing the Rule gradually may
minimize the effect of any unanticipated consequences and, impor-
tantly, permit regulators to adjust the Rule’s scope based on actual
(rather than anticipated) market reaction.179
The Goldilocks approach is not without precedent.  Regulators,
from time to time, have implemented new regulations gradually in
order to assess their impact on the financial markets.180  For example,
177 The FSOC Study notes that banks will be required to develop new regulatory and
supervisory tools beyond their current risk management systems. See FSOC STUDY, supra
note 172, at 31 (noting that current risk management frameworks, because they are de- R
signed principally to limit losses, will need to be redeveloped to prioritize compliance with
the Volcker Rule’s prohibitions).  Regulators, as well, will need significant resources to hire
and train staff with quantitative and market expertise, to develop and analyze data, and to
review information in order to identify prohibited activities. See id. at 43–44.  In addition,
banks must collect and test new data, including metrics to assess industry-wide trading on a
desk-by-desk basis, as well as compare bank trading with hedge fund and other proprietary
operations. See id. at 42 (noting that regulators, by increasing the diversity of data points
they survey and collect, will have a more accurate representation of the trading activities of
banking entities).
178 See Ben Protess, Volcker Rule Divides Regulators, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2011), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/volcker-rule-divides-regulators/; Stewart, supra note
176. R
179 In fact, as the markets evolve, the impact of the Volcker Rule is also likely to
change.  Regulators, the FSOC Study cautions, must be “flexible and dynamic” in imple-
menting the Rule. FSOC STUDY, supra note 172, at 32.  In addition, the Study notes, “mar- R
kets, products and trading activity will continue to evolve,” reflecting change in the
financial markets over time. Id. at 26.  Regulation will be ineffective if it fails to account for
that change.  As a result, the Study finds that the constant measurement and remeasure-
ment of relevant metrics is vital. Id.
180 An iterative version of staging has also been promoted in environmental regula-
tion.  Referred to as “adaptive management,” it provides for the continued monitoring of
environmental systems that are subject to regulation and the evaluation and adaptation of
the relevant rules to reflect their performance, the resulting outcomes, and changes in
those systems. See J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95
MINN. L. REV. 424, 424–25, 427–36 (2010) (exploring judicial scrutiny of adaptive manage-
ment plans and procedures).  Monitoring and adjusting regulation over an extended pe-
riod can be costly.  Among other things, it requires a long-term commitment of human
and financial resources as well as the ongoing monitoring by stakeholders of both new
decisions and the decision-making process. See Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management as an
Information Problem, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1455, 1478–79 (2011) (questioning the effectiveness of
adaptive management when faced with information challenges); see also Alejandro E. Ca-
macho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change:  Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning In-
frastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 74 (2009) (noting the importance of sustained funding).  It
may also be ineffective to the extent that monitoring fails to yield the information neces-
sary for long-term learning and improvement. See Doremus, supra, at 1458–62; James E.
Lyons et al., Monitoring in the Context of Structured Decision-Making and Adaptive Management,
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regulators may choose to gradually phase in the Volcker Rule in order
to grant banking entities sufficient time to conform to the Rule’s new
requirements.  Yet, as presently proposed, the gradual phase-in does
not expressly provide for modification of the Rule to reflect new infor-
mation developed during the phase-in period,181 although regulators
could, of course, propose amendments to the new regulations if they
think it necessary to do so.182  The Basel III capital requirements183
are also subject to a phase-in period.184  Regulators intend a portion
of the phase-in to permit a gradual transition to higher capital stan-
dards through earnings retention and raising capital.185 Standards
with which regulators have less experience, such as liquidity and lever-
age ratios, will also be phased in gradually, partly in order to observe
their impact on the financial markets and address any unanticipated
consequences.186
That approach, in fact, is what was adopted when the TRACE sys-
tem was first introduced in the United States.  Recall that, beginning
in 2002, all broker-dealers were required to report trade prices, quan-
tities, and other information regarding bond transactions through the
TRACE system.  Market participants were particularly concerned that
the new reporting requirements could harm liquidity in the credit
markets.187  In response, as part of the rulemaking process, the Na-
72 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 1683, 1690–91 (2008) (analysis of monitoring in adaptive wetland
management).  Although adaptive management and staging share a common feature—
both address decision making in the face of incomplete knowledge—the Goldilocks ap-
proach is less ambitious.  Its focus is on staging at the time a new rule is implemented, with
adjustments based on new knowledge the regulators obtain during the staging process.
The time period for monitoring and feedback is more limited than under adaptive man-
agement—taking place when stakeholders are most focused on the new rules—and, there-
fore, the cost to regulators and stakeholders is likely to be less significant. See infra notes
208–09 and accompanying text. R
181 See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in,
and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846,
68,848, 68,854 (Nov. 7, 2011); see also Conformance Period for Entities Engaged in Prohib-
ited Proprietary Trading or Private Equity Fund or Hedge Fund Activities, 76 Fed. Reg.
8265, 8266–67 (Feb. 14, 2011) (noting that the conformance period exists primarily to
allow banks time to adjust their operations to the demands of the rule).
182 See, e.g., Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests
in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. at
68,883–84 (noting that regulators will use the conformance period to study the design and
utility of measures required by the new Volcker Rule regulations, and if necessary, propose
changes to the reporting requirements).
183 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. R
184 See BASEL COMM., GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, supra note 61, at 10 & Annex 4. R
185 See id. at 10.
186 See id. at 10, 63; Stefan Walter, Sec’y Gen., Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision,
Speech on Basel III and Financial Stability, 5th Biennial Conference on Risk Management
and Supervision (Nov. 3–4, 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp101109a.
htm; see also Romano, supra note 6, at 50 (noting that “imposing a lengthy transition is a R
way to hedge one’s bets”).
187 See supra notes 136–39 and accompanying text. R
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tional Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), who were re-
sponsible for implementing the TRACE system, proposed a phase-in
schedule that included input on transparency and liquidity issues
from a newly created Bond Transaction Reporting Committee
(BTRC).188  Under the terms of the new rules, the NASD had the au-
thority to determine how and at what pace to expand public dissemi-
nation of bond data, and it could do so based on the
recommendations of the BTRC.  Those recommendations reflected
the experience with liquidity gained over time as the NASD imple-
mented the new TRACE system rules.189  As a result, the corporate
bond markets became increasingly transparent.  TRACE initially cov-
ered 500 bonds in July 2002, expanded to 4,600 bonds in April 2003
and 17,000 bonds in October 2004, and finally expanded to full cover-
age of virtually all corporate bonds—approximately 29,000 bonds—
roughly two and one-half years after its launch.190
Roberta Romano191 and John Coates192 recently advocated the
inclusion of mandatory “sunset” provisions in new financial regula-
tion.193  Under a sunset provision, a statute or rule would expire on a
specified date unless it was reenacted194 or, at the least, found by the
relevant regulator to have benefits that outweigh its costs.195  Depend-
ing on its length, a shorter sunset period may simply be an extended
version of the Goldilocks approach.  Both focus on evaluating new
rules and incorporating postenactment information into new regula-
tion—minimizing the risk of unanticipated consequences—without
requiring (but not excluding) formal amendment by Congress or the
regulators.196
188 See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and
Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendment No. 4 to the
Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Relating to
the Creation of a Corporate Bond Trade Reporting and Transaction Dissemination Facility
and the Elimination of Nasdaq’s Fixed Income Pricing System, 66 Fed. Reg. 8131, 8133
(Jan. 29, 2001).
189 See id.
190 See Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., NASD’s Fully Implemented
“TRACE” Brings Unprecedented Transparency to Corporate Bond Market (Feb. 7, 2005),
available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2005/P013274.
191 See Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT FINAN-
CIER: CORP. FIN. & CAPITAL MARKETS L. REV., 2011, at 172, 176–77.
192 See Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising: Hearing  Before the Subcomm. on Secs.,
Ins., and Inv. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 6–7 (2011)
[hereinafter Hearing, Coates], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=1973258 (statement of John C. Coates, IV, Professor of Law and Economics,
Harvard Law School).
193 Competing analyses of sunset provisions appear in Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legis-
lation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 249–98 (2007), and Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1041–67 (2011).
194 See Romano, supra note 191, at 175–76. R
195 See Hearing, Coates, supra note 192, at 6; Romano, supra note 191, at 177. R
196 See Hearing, Coates, supra note 192, at 7; Romano, supra note 191, at 176. R
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Like the Goldilocks approach, a principal benefit of sunsetting is
the ability to legislate (or relegislate) with new and more accurate in-
formation.197  Both, however, raise many of the same concerns.  Stag-
ing or sunsetting may be difficult if market participants view a
particular version of a new rule as the status quo.198  Likewise, both
may increase the cost of doing business due to greater uncertainty
over the nature and scope of the final rules.199  There is also a chance
that staging and sunsetting will create a series of lobbying opportuni-
ties by regulated firms, increasing the risk of regulatory capture.200  In
addition, the announcement that new regulations will be phased in
over time (or potentially repealed) may increase risk-taking activity
during the interim period.  For example, a bank has an incentive to
increase risk if it anticipates greater capital requirements in the fu-
ture.  Tougher requirements will limit the bank’s ability to invest in
risky, and potentially profitable, assets once those requirements are
effective.  The bank, therefore, may invest in risky assets today in an
effort to increase the amount of capital it has against investments that
can be made in the future once the new rules are in place.201
Under the Goldilocks approach, regulators could offset these
concerns by including clear goals in the new rules and specifying that
they may be modified (consistent with those goals) depending on new
information the regulator develops during the phase-in process.  The
new rules should also detail the procedures through which new infor-
mation is provided to the regulator and made available to the general
public.202  In addition, clearly articulating the criteria that a regulator
197 See Hearing, Coates, supra note 192, at 7; Gersen, supra note 193, at 266–72; Ro- R
mano, supra note 191, at 172–76 (describing how additional information may be useful in R
implementing the Dodd-Frank Act).
198 For an analysis of factors underlying status quo bias, see Daniel Kahneman et al.,
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193,
197–98 (1991).
199 See Romano, supra note 191, at 177.  Sunsetting, in particular, may exacerbate un- R
certainty over new regulation since sunset periods are likely to be of longer duration than
staging.  Kysar, supra note 193, at 1063–65 (describing economic and social costs of the R
uncertainty created by legislation that contains a sunset provision).
200 See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI.
3, 3, 6–12 (1971) (arguing that private interests are likely to attempt to use public regula-
tion as a source of profit by co-opting the legal regime).  For a discussion of the concerns
over regulatory capture by the financial services industry, see Brett McDonnell & Daniel
Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1643–44 (2011).
201 See Blum, supra note 67, at 755–57.  The same distortion may result from regulation R
that is subject to a sunset provision.  See Kysar, supra note 193, at 1045–46. R
202 By detailing the process, the new regulation would minimize the potential for regu-
lators and others to limit the timing, amount, and types of participation in the staging
process by interested parties. See Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from
a Study in Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 309–23, 350–51 (2007) (criticiz-
ing the limited participation by stakeholders in Habitat Conservation Plans under the En-
dangered Species Act, in part due to the regulators’ restrictive interpretation of their
discretion in permitting such participation, and arguing for more detailed procedures).
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uses to assess costs and benefits and the authority it has to adjust regu-
lation in light of its consequences can help minimize the incremental
risk of regulatory capture that staging may create.203  An expert
panel’s ability to provide its own assessment of new regulation—inde-
pendent of the regulator—may also act as a check against regulatory
bias.204  Like the TRACE system, the panel could create a formal re-
cord of its deliberations, also made publicly available, when assessing
the new rules along the specified criteria.205
Parties who are interested in new regulation may have incentives
to minimize the amount of information that regulators (or an expert
panel) can collect.  They may believe that, by limiting or controlling
feedback, they can obtain more favorable treatment as the new rules
are staged.206  That possibility would need to be taken into account
when deciding whether or not to stage new regulation.  Market par-
ticipants, however, are just as likely to be interested in revealing pri-
vate information than risk being saddled with costly new rules.
Deliberately adjusting behavior to influence the regulatory response
can be expensive, particularly if other market participants take advan-
tage of the change.  With the Volcker Rule, for example, a firm that
claims it is unable to make a market in particular securities may lose
that business to others who choose to make a market in its place.
Consequently, general market reaction to the new rules is likely to
also be an important source of feedback.207
The Goldilocks approach has two clear advantages over sunset-
ting.  First, unlike sunsetting, staging is more likely to take place when
there continues to be a focus on the new rules, increasing the likeli-
hood of a more meaningful review before the general public’s atten-
203 See Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 180, at 471–72 (noting the need for adaptive man- R
agement plans to be “as detailed as practical”).
204 That will depend, in part, on how independent the expert panel is from the regula-
tors implementing the new rule.  Greater independence and transparency may assist in
developing more effective regulation. See McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 200, at 1632 R
(describing the role of “regulatory contrarians” in independently assessing regulators and
regulatory initiatives).
205 Romano has made a similar recommendation in the context of sunsetting. See Ro-
mano, supra note 191, at 176. R
206 See LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note 43, at 499. R
207 See Gersen, supra note 193, at 271–72, 277–78 (noting this tendency but also its R
practical limitations).  This assumes that the feedback provided from staging will occur
quickly enough to be taken into account as new rules are implemented.  Like in the case of
adaptive management, see supra note 180, the decision to stage new financial risk regula- R
tion should take into account the extent to which new information can become available to
regulators during the staging process. See Doremus, supra note 180, at 1467–77 (describing R
the need to consider information gaps in adaptive management).  Over time, the regula-
tors’ experience with staging will itself provide feedback information regarding which
kinds of regulation are most suited for staging and the optimal procedures to be adopted
in gathering information and modifying new rules as they are implemented. See Camacho,
supra note 202, at 342–44. R
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tion turns elsewhere.208  That continued attention can minimize the
risk of regulatory capture of the review and assessment process.209
Second, staging permits regulators to adopt more effective regulation
from the outset, even in the face of concern that the new rules may
create other problems.  Introducing a new rule in stages can minimize
that uncertainty so long as regulators can modify the rule to reflect
new information that arises during the staging process.210  It can also
limit the cost of new regulation that is ineffective or results in unantic-
ipated consequences.211
There is a possibility that new rules will reflect an initial overesti-
mation of the financial risks they are intended to address.  An assess-
ment soon thereafter may not reflect a clear balance of the actual
costs and benefits.212  Lengthening the period over which regulators
stage new regulation and relying on an expert panel for assistance can
address part of that concern.  Moreover, by encouraging the collec-
tion of additional information, staging can provide a more objective
measure than current rulemaking of the costs and benefits of, and
need to adapt, new regulation to a changing marketplace.213  Finally,
by permitting regulators to modify new rules, the Goldilocks approach
can help minimize the unanticipated costs of a sunset date that itself
may be set unintentionally too late.214
CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the potential for unanticipated conse-
quences in the introduction of new financial risk regulation.  Bank
and other financial firm managers engage in a wide range of private
conduct, some of which may become subject to the new rules.  What
the rules do not regulate is all conduct or the factors influencing that
conduct, which may be difficult for outsiders to observe.
The Goldilocks approach strikes a compromise between finaliz-
ing new rules at the outset and implementing new rules with sunset
provisions.  The former forces regulators to assess the effect of new
rules with incomplete information; the latter increases the risk of reg-
208 See Kysar, supra note 193, at 1043–45, 1051–54 (describing the risk of regulatory R
capture by interest groups as a regulation approaches its sunset date).
209 See supra note 200 and accompanying text. R
210 See supra notes 159–64 and accompanying text. R
211 See Luppi & Parisi, supra note 149, at 28–29. R
212 See Gersen, supra note 193, at 269–70.  That concern may be exaggerated.  Cogni- R
tive biases may also result in a lack of regulation in some circumstances. See Kysar, supra
note 193, at 1048–50.  For a description of the cognitive failures that can influence regula- R
tors and new regulation, see McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 200, at 1636–42. R
213 See McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 200, at 1674–75 (describing the importance R
of performance metrics in assessing how well regulators perform their jobs).
214 See Kysar, supra note 193, at 1050 (describing the challenges of setting a correct R
sunset date).
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ulatory capture around the time a sunset period ends.  Staging new
regulation—so long as the criteria used to assess regulation, and the
procedures used to monitor and modify regulation, are specified up
front—can help minimize unanticipated consequences and create
more effective rules based on more complete information.  Moving
the regulatory process in that direction may be particularly timely in
light of recent concerns over ineffective cost-benefit analyses under-
taken by financial regulators under the Dodd-Frank Act.215
None of this is to suggest that the Goldilocks approach is not
without its own costs.  Many of those costs, however, are shared with
both the current and sunsetting approaches to rulemaking.  The dif-
ference is that staging permits new regulation to be modified up front
as market participants adjust their actions in response to new restric-
tions.  Doing so increases the likelihood that regulators can and will
address unanticipated consequences sooner, and at lower cost, than
under the alternatives.
215 See CCMR Letter, supra note 159. R
